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and	 provide	 a	 basis	 for	 equitable	 growth,	 has	 not	 been	 effectively	 implemented	 in	many	
parts	of	the	world.	Comparing	South	Korea,	Taiwan,	Thailand	and	the	Philippines	following	
the	Second	World	War,	 it	 seeks	to	explain	why	there	 is	variation	 in	 the	 implementation	of	
land	reform	across	these	cases.	 It	argues	that	 in	order	for	 land	reform	to	be	implemented,	
two	 conditions	must	be	met.	 The	 first	 condition	 is	 that	 governing	elites’	 hold	on	power	 is	




















































































Land	 reform	 can	 reduce	 poverty	 and	 support	 broad	 based	 economic	 development,	 as	
evidenced	in	the	transfer	of	land	from	relatively	large	landowners	to	tenants	and	laborers	in	
South	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan	 following	 the	 Second	 World	 War.	 While	 land	 reform	 was,	 and	
continues	to	be,	relevant	in	Thailand	and	the	Philippines,	comprehensive	land	redistribution	
has	 not	 occurred.	 South	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan	 were	 poor	 half	 a	 century	 ago,	 but	 are	 now	
amongst	 the	wealthiest	 and	 egalitarian	 countries	 in	 the	world.	 The	 sensational	 growth	 of	





Existing	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 studies	 demonstrate	 the	 relationship	 between	 land	
reform,	 poverty	 reduction	 and	 broad	 based	 economic	 development	 (Tai	 1974;	 Kuo	 1976;	
Overholt	1976;	Berry	and	Cline	1979;	World	Bank	1993;	Rodrik	1995;	Reyes	2002).1		When	
land	is	distributed	unequally,	agricultural	development	and	the	broader	progress	of	society	
is	 impeded.	 Large	 landowners	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 amassing	 land	 rather	 than	 improving	 the	
productivity	of	existing	 land	under	their	ownership.	While	 this	may	 increase	their	personal	
wealth,	 it	does	not	 raise	 famers’	 incomes.	Providing	 land	 to	enterprising	peasants	 is	more	
likely	 to	 result	 in	 increased	yields	and	a	 subsequent	 rise	 in	 farmers’	 incomes.	 Land	 reform	
																																																								





can	also	unfreeze	unproductive	 capital	 invested	 in	 land	and	divert	 it	 to	other	parts	of	 the	
economy	(Tai	1974).		
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 Taiwan,	 land	 reform	 improved	 farmers’	 income	 and	 provided	 them	 with	
economic	 security.	 This	 enabled	 them	 to	 send	 their	 children	 to	 school,	 which	 created	 an	
educated	and	skilled	workforce	capable	of	supporting	the	countries’	industrialization	efforts	
(Shin	1998).	The	new	class	of	farmers	was	also	a	market	for	consumer	goods,	which	further	
supported	 the	 move	 towards	 an	 industrialized	 economy.	 The	 transformation	 resulted	 in	
rapid	 urbanization,	 which	 made	 larger	 and	 more	 productive	 farms	 possible	 overtime	
(Overholt	1976).	The	egalitarian	nature	of	the	land	reforms	in	both	Taiwan	and	South	Korea	
is	important.	Land	reform	changed	the	structure	of	society.	This	allowed	governing	elites	in	
both	 countries	 to	 carry	 out	 further	 economic	 reforms	 (Rodrik	 1995)	 and	 prevented	




In	 Thailand	 and	 the	 Philippines,	 elected	 and	 non-elected	 regimes	 alike	 have	 failed	 to	




out	 of	 poverty.	 Focusing	 on	 the	 Philippines,	 Putzel	 (1992)	 explains,	 the	 model	 of	 land	
ownership	has	created	both	poverty	and	low	rates	of	agricultural	productivity.	While	today	
the	Philippines	is	one	of	the	fastest	growing	economies	in	Asia,	the	number	of	Filipinos	living	
below	the	national	poverty	 line	 in	2015	was	26.3	percent;	a	 similar	 figure	was	 reported	 in	
2001	by	the	World	Bank.	Poverty	is	most	prevalent	in	the	Philippines’	agriculture	sector	and	
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it	 is	 this	 sector	 that	 also	witnesses	 the	 slowest	 rates	 of	 poverty	 reduction.	According	 to	 a	
World	 Bank	 study	 completed	 in	 2001,	 agriculture	 dependent	 households	 made-up	
approximately	66	percent	of	those	in	poverty	in	the	Philippines	while	only	accounting	for	40	
percent	of	the	population	(in	Vargas	2003).	Where	land	reform	has	been	carried	out	in	the	
Philippines,	 it	 has	 had	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 rates	 of	 poverty	 incidence	 among	 farmer	
beneficiaries	(Reyes	2002	in	Vargas	2003).	Without	comprehensive	land	reform,	the	number	
of	 beneficiaries	 remains	 low.	 Similar	 links	 between	 landlessness	 and	 poverty	 have	 been	
established	in	the	case	of	Thailand	(Krongkaew	1985).		
	
Despite	 the	 broad	 consensus	 that	 land	 reform	 supports	 poverty	 alleviation	 and	 equitable	
economic	development,	since	the	1970s	policy-makers	 in	 the	West	have	been	reluctant	 to	
support	 state-led	 land	 reform	 programs	 (Adams	 1995).	 Borras	 explains,	 “changes	 in	
international	 political	 economy	 have	 transformed	 the	 structure	 of,	 limits	 to,	 and	
opportunities	 for	 redistributive	 reforms	 like	 land	 reform”	 (2007,	 p.	 10).	 International	
development	organizations,	such	as	 the	World	Bank	and	the	 International	Monetary	Fund,	
prefer	 market-based	 solutions	 to	 development	 issues.	 In	 the	 agrarian	 context,	 this	 has	
resulted	 in	 efforts	 to	 modernize	 and	 update	 cadastral	 systems	 and	 land	 registries,	 which	
make	the	sale	and	purchase	of	 land	easier	(Bernstein	2002).	However,	 if	 the	objective	is	to	
reduce	 poverty	 and	 raise	 productivity	 a	 “transformation	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 power”	 in	 the	
countryside	and	society	more	generally	is	required	(Sobhan	1993,	p.	7	in	Boyce	et.	al.	2005).	
Land	 reform	would	 achieve	 this.	Without	 this	 underlying	 change,	 development	 objectives	
are	unlikely	to	be	met	(Boyce	et.	al.	2005).			
	
Development	organizations	have	 since	 the	1990s	 reconsidered	 the	 role	of	 the	market	and	
the	state	 in	economic	and	human	development.	 In	 its	 first	major	statement	on	 land	policy	




still	 continues	 to	 prioritize	 the	 strict	 maintenance	 of	 property	 rights.	 By	 its	 very	 nature,	
comprehensive	 land	reform	challenges	this	principle.	Land	reform	as	a	policy	might	appear	
innocuous,	but	it	is	unlikely	to	be	advanced	by	international	development	institutions	or	the	
Western	 countries	 that	 fund	 them	 because	 it	 runs	 contrary	 to	 a	 founding	 principle	 of	
capitalism.		
	
Western	policy-makers	may	not	 support	 the	 implementation	of	 land	 reform,	but	 this	does	
not	mean	that	it	is	irrelevant	at	the	nation-state	level.	Wolf	Ladejinsky,	a	leading	advocate	of	
land	 reform	 in	 the	post-war	decades,	explains	 it	 is	 largely	a	domestic	 issue	because	 it	 is	 a	
“reflection	of	a	particular	political	balance	of	forces	in	a	country”	(1964,	p.	8).		Lipton	(2009)	
agrees	 that	 any	 study	of	 land	 reform	 should	 focus	on	domestic	 actors.	 The	 key	actors	 are	
those	who	govern	and	those	who	own	land,	although	the	degree	of	overlap	between	these	
two	 groups	 is	 common	 in	 countries	 in	 need	 of	 land	 reform.	 Large	 landowners	 are	
understandably	 resistant	 to	 not	 only	 the	 redistribution	 of	 their	 land,	 but	 also	 the	
redistribution	of	their	economic	and	political	power,	which	is	derived	from	land	ownership.	




Taiwan	 and	 South	 Korea,	 but	 not	 Thailand	 and	 the	 Philippines.	 It	 tests,	 integrates	 and	









the	 decades	 following	 the	 Second	World	War.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 and	 in	 line	
with	 definitions	 produced	 by	 Putzel	 (1992)	 and	 Lipton	 (2009),	 land	 reform	 consists	 of	
legislation	introduced	by	the	state	that	increases	the	percentage	of	cultivable	land	owned	by	
the	 poor	 and	 reduces	 the	 concentration	 of	 landownership	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 a	 few	 large	
landowners.	While	 ‘land	reform’	and	 ‘agrarian	reform’	are	often	used	 interchangeably,	 the	
term	 agrarian	 reform	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	 Cold	 War.	 It	 was	 used	 to	 differentiate	 ‘non-
communist’	 land	 redistribution	 and	 rural	 development	 measures	 from	 ‘communist’	 land	
reform	 (Adams	 1995).	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 the	 term	 ‘land	 reform’	 is	 primarily	
used,	which	no	longer	has	specific	communist	connotations.						
	
It	 is	 helpful	 to	 place	 land	 reform	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 the	 history	 of	 landownership.	
Kennedy	 (1982)	 explains	 that	 as	 people	 started	 to	move	 away	 from	nomadic	 hunting	 and	
gathering	towards	more	settled	agriculture	in	circa	10,000	BCE,	the	value	of	cultivatable	land	
grew	rapidly,	as	did	the	power	of	those	who	controlled	it.	Territory	was	won	and	lost	on	the	






political	 power	 both	within	 their	 local	 region	 and,	 to	 some	 degree,	 centrally.	 This	 type	 of	
landlord	 continues	 to	 exist	 in	 one	 form	 or	 another	 in	 many	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 where	
comprehensive	land	reform	has	never	occurred.	An	example	is	the	United	Kingdom,	where,	






Throughout	 history,	 when	 feudal	 landlords	 lost	 control	 over	 their	 land,	 violence	 was	 a	




means,	 but	 via	 economic	 prowess	 within	 an	 already	 established	 political	 order.	 These	
landlords	were	typically	enterprising	 farmers	or	merchants	and	were	 likely	to	have	smaller	
landholdings	than	feudal	landlords,	and	no	preordained	political	power	(Dore	1965).	In	some	















3	Kulaks	 were	 peasants	 wealthy	 enough	 to	 own	 a	 farm	 and	 hire	 labor.	 Agricultural	 collectivization	 saw	 the	
consolidation	of	individual	landholdings	and	labor	into	collective	farms	owned	by	the	central	Soviet	state.		
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2009),	Malaysia	 and	 Indonesia	opted	 for	 land	 resettlement	 schemes,	 given	 their	 access	 to	
undeveloped,	 virgin	 land.	 Land	 reform	 has	 been	 an	 ongoing	 issue	 in	 Thailand	 and	 the	






years	 of	 Japanese	 colonial	 rule.	 Following	 the	 Japanese	 surrender	 in	 1945	 the	 Korean	
Peninsula	was	divided	 into	 two	occupation	zones.	Administered	 in	 the	north	by	 the	Soviet	
Union	and	in	the	south	by	the	United	States,	the	division	felt	increasingly	permanent	and	by	
1948	 two	 separate	 nation-states	 had	 been	 created.4	The	 Korean	War,	 which	 broke	 out	 in	
1950,	solidified	the	north-south	divide.	Land	reform	was	 implemented	 in	two	stages	 in	the	
south	 with	 this	 immense	 political	 and	military	 struggle	 playing	 out	 in	 the	 background.	 In	
1948,	the	American	Military	Government	distributed	240,000	hectares	of	land	that	had	been	
owned	by	the	Japanese	to	former	tenants.	This	equated	to	11.7	percent	of	total	cultivatable	
land.	 Following	 the	 formal	 division	 of	 the	 peninsula	 and	 creation	 of	 two	 separate	 nation-
states,	the	South	Korean	Government	initiated	land	reform	in	1950,	prior	to	the	breakout	of	
the	Korean	War.	Land	ownership	was	restricted	to	three	hectares	enabling	the	South	Korean	
Government	 to	 redistribute	 a	 further	 330,000	 hectares	 of	 cultivatable	 land	 by	 1952.	
Landlords	 sold	 an	 additional	 500,000	 hectares	 directly	 to	 their	 tenants	 prior	 to	 the	
implementation	of	 the	government’s	program.	Overall,	 this	 saw	52	percent	of	 cultivatable	
land	change	hands.	By	1956,	the	wealthiest	6	percent	of	rural	households	owned	18	percent	















in	 the	 years	 to	 come.	 The	 extensive	 program	 of	 land	 reform	 led	 by	 Governor	 Chen	
undoubtedly	contributed	to	the	KMT’s	political	entrenchment.6	The	program	was	rolled	out	
over	 several	 phases.	 In	 1949	 farm	 rents	 were	 reduced	 from	 50	 percent	 to	 37.5	 percent,	
which	 aided	 close	 to	 half	 of	 all	 farm	 households.	 All	 land	 that	 was	 held	 by	 Japanese	
nationals,	which	amounted	to	approximately	20	percent	of	Taiwan’s	cultivatable	 land,	was	
sold	 by	 the	 state	 to	 tenants,	 helping	 approximately	 20	 percent	 of	 tenant	 farmers.	 Most	
significantly,	 in	 1953	 landowners	 were	 required	 to	 sell	 all	 tenanted	 land	 exceeding	 three	
hectares	to	the	state	under	the	Land-to-the-Tiller	Act.	The	state	then	resold	this	land	to	the	
tenants	for	the	same	37.5	percent	that	they	were	previously	paying	 in	rent.	These	reforms	













The	 Philippines	 endured	 more	 than	 400	 years	 of	 Spanish	 colonialism,7	half	 a	 century	 of	
American	colonialism	and	 three	years	of	 Japanese	occupation	 from	1942	 to	1945.	 In	1946	
the	 United	 States	 relinquished	 its	 sovereignty.	 The	 archipelago	 gained	 independence	 and	







legislation	 that	was	pushed	 through	 the	Philippine	Congress,	 but	not	 implemented	due	 to	
landlord	 obstruction	 (Starner	 1961);	Marcos’s	 attempt	 at	 agrarian	 reform	 in	 1971	 and	 his	
accompanying	proclamation	that	it	would	be	the	“cornerstone	of	the	New	Society”	(Estrella	



















of	democracy	 in	 the	1970s,	 the	 state	 spent	 little	 time	 thinking	about	 land	 reform.	 Instead	
farmer’s	demands	were	addressed	on	an	impromptu	basis	by	 limiting	rent	and	regularizing	
the	size	of	landholdings	(Ramsay	1982).	The	Sanya	Government	passed	the	Land	Reform	Act	
in	 1975,	 but	 the	 incoming	 Kukrit	 Administration	 failed	 to	 implement	 the	 legislation.	
Industrialization	saw	the	rise	 in	 landlessness	among	tillers	as	capitalists	purchased	 land	for	
commercial	 cropping	 (White	 2012).	 From	 the	 1980s,	 land	 resettlement	 schemes	 became	
more	 common	 than	 land	 redistribution	 programs	 (Ledesma	 1980b;	 Lipton	 2009).	 Limited	




The	 remainder	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 structured	 around	 four	 chapters.	 Chapter	 Two	 discusses	
existing	studies	on	the	politics	of	land	reform.	Contemporary	literature	is	limited	and	studies	
from	the	1960s,	1970s	and	1980s	need	further	reflection.	Much	of	the	literature	focuses	on	
the	 history	 of	 the	 respective	 countries,	 the	 geopolitical	 climate	 and	 the	 role	 of	 external	
actors.	 For	 example,	 emphasis	 is	 placed	 on	 the	 colonial	 legacy	 of	 the	 Spanish	 in	 the	
Philippines	 and	 the	 Japanese	 in	 South	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan.	 Others	 point	 to	 the	 threat	 that	






relationship	 between	 legitimacy	 building	 and	 class	 coalitions.	 Hung-chao	 Tai	 places	 this	
relationship	at	the	center	of	his	1972	book	The	Politics	of	Land	Reform,	which	covers	two	of	
the	 four	 case	 studies	 this	 research	 examines:	 Taiwan	 and	 the	 Philippines.	Drawing	 on	 the	
existing	 literature,	 Chapter	 Three	 outlines	 an	 integrated	 theory	 on	 the	 politics	 of	 land	
































explore	 important	 ideas.	 As	 interventionist	 policies	 such	 as	 land	 reform	 have	 waned	 in	
popularity,	it	seems	so	have	comparative	works	that	study	the	topic.	Land	reform	continues	
to	 be	 a	 relevant	 issue	 in	 the	 Philippines,	 Thailand	 and	 many	 other	 countries.	 This	 thesis	
draws	 upon	 the	 existing	 literature	 to	 develop	 and	 test	 the	 theory	 on	 the	 politics	 of	 land	
reform.	This	chapter	will	analyze	attempts	within	 the	existing	 literature	 to	explain	why	we	
see	variation	in	the	implementation	of	land	reform	in	the	four	cases	under	study.	The	survey	
of	 the	 literature	 begins	 by	 discussing	 the	 contribution	 of	 individual	 academics	 works.	 To	
make	 it	 easier	 to	 analyze	 the	 arguments	 presented,	 the	 existing	 literature	 has	 been	
organized	 into	 four	 categories:	 path	 dependency,	 agency,	 political	 instability	 and	 state	
capability.		
	
Elias	H.	Tuma	made	an	early	attempt	 to	build	a	 theory	of	 land	 reform	 in	his	1965	work	 In	
Twenty-Six	 Centuries	 of	 Agrarian	 Reform,	 a	 Comparative	 Analysis.	 Tuma	 covers	 the	
economic,	 social	 and	 political	 objectives	 of	 land	 reform	 and	 its	 impact	 across	 eight	 cases,	








land	 reform	 in	 the	 Philippines,	 Taiwan	 and	 six	 other	 countries.	 At	 the	 center	 of	 Tai’s	
explanation	 of	 land	 reform	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 legitimacy	 building	 and	 class	
coalitions.	 These	 two	 variables	 appear	 to	 be	 significant	 factors	 that	 drive	 the	
implementation	of	land	reform.	Tai	also	emphasizes	that	it	is	easier	for	democratic	regimes	
to	implement	land	reform	than	non-democratic	regimes;	this	thesis	questions	the	relevance	





date.	 Ledesma’s	 articles	 are	 a	 comparative	 study	 of	 the	 socio-economic	 and	 political	
dimensions	 of	 land	 reform	 in	 the	 region.	 Usefully,	 Ledesma	 discusses	 the	 relationship	
between	 political	 elites	 and	 landed	 classes	 and	 also	 reflects	 on	 the	 role	 of	 legitimacy	
building.	While	much	of	what	Ledesma	discusses	is	of	value	and	he	masterfully	summarizes	




Industrialization	 and	 Development	 provides	 useful	 context	 on	 land	 reform.	 While	 it	 is	
comparative	in	nature,	Kay’s	research	question	differs	from	that	of	this	thesis.	Kay	seeks	to	
explain	 why	 the	 ‘Newly	 Industrialized	 Countries’	 of	 East	 Asia	 overtook	 Latin	 American	





Wolf	 Ladejinsky,	 an	 American	 agricultural	 economist	 who	 worked	 for	 the	 United	 States	
Department	of	Agriculture,	the	Ford	Foundation	and	the	World	Bank,	writes	persuasively	on	
land	 reform.	While	 much	 of	 his	 work	 focuses	 on	 Japan,	 India	 and	 Vietnam,	 he	 discusses	
other	countries	in	the	region,	including	the	Philippines	and	Taiwan.	Ladejinsky’s	value	lies	in	













land	 reform	 in	 the	 Philippines,	 Putzel	 includes	 useful	 comparisons	 with	 South	 Korea	 and	










places	 much	 emphasis	 on	 the	 mechanics	 of	 reform,	 including	 the	 strength	 of	 peasant	
organizations,	 the	 bureaucracy	 and	 the	 role	 of	 centralized	 power,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	
analyzing	the	politics	of	land	reform.	Perhaps	this	is	because	he	notes	that	land	reform	was	





Aquino’s	 call	 for	 land	 reform.	 He	 has	 a	 tendency	 to	 state	 the	 obvious	 without	 making	
enough	 of	 an	 effort	 to	 expose	 underlying	 issues.	 For	 example,	 Riedinger	 argues	 that	
President	Aquino	was	 responding	 to	 these	 following	 factors	when	deciding	 to	 legislate	 for	
land	reform:		
a	 highly	 skewed	 pattern	 of	 Philippine	 landownership,	 characterized	 by	 widespread	 rural	
poverty,	 low	 agricultural	 productivity,	 and	 a	 history	 of	 tenure-related	 peasant	 unrest;	
concerns	 about	 political	 legitimacy	 and	 a	 related	 desire	 to	 incorporate	 the	 rural	 poor	 into	
political	life	(motivated	both	by	rural	unrest	and	a	commitment	to	participatory	democracy);	
and	 the	 influence	 of	 Philippine	 and	 international	 development	 strategists,	 who	 pushed	
reform	as	an	economic	and	political	corrective	(p.	216).			
These	may	 all	 be	motivating	 factors	 for	 President	 Aquino,	 but	 Riedinger’s	work	would	 be	




Kuhonta’s	 2011	 book,	 The	 Institutional	 Imperative,	 studies	 the	 role	 institutions	 play	 in	
promoting	economic	development	 in	Thailand	and	 the	Philippines,	alongside	Malaysia	and	
Vietnam.	 	His	 argument	 that	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 state	 is	 central	 to	 the	 implementation	of	
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land	 reform,	 among	 other	 policies,	 is	 useful	 to	 an	 extent.	 It	 does	 not	 address	 politics,	
however,	which	play	a	role	 in	determining	whether	a	state	has	capacity	to	 implement	land	
reform.	Lynn	T.	White,	in	his	2012	book,	Political	Booms,	explains	why	Taiwan,	Thailand	and	






by	 Krishna	 Ghimire,	 Land	 Reform	 and	 Peasant	 Livelihoods,	 is	 one	 example.	 While	 this	
literature	 is	 important,	 it	 ignores	 the	politics	of	 land	 reform	at	 the	 state	and	 international	
level	and	in	doing	so	fails	to	provide	a	complete	answer	to	the	research	question	this	thesis	
seeks	to	answer.	Moreover,	it	serves	a	different	objective	than	the	one	that	this	thesis	seeks	
to	 fulfill	 in	 that	 studies	 conducted	 from	 a	 democratic	 perspective	 are	more	 normative	 in	
nature.	 Granted	 some	 of	 the	 objective	 information	 gathered	 from	 these	 studies	 on	 why	




Boyce,	 Rosset	 and	 Stanton	 (2005),	 are	 more	 interested	 in	 studying	 the	 benefits	 of	 land	
reform	and,	like	Ghimire	(2001),	also	place	a	strong	emphasis	on	grassroots	engagement.	In	
doing	 so,	 however,	 they	 fail	 to	 address	 the	 inherently	 political	 nature	 of	 land	 reform.	 By	
discussing	the	benefits	of	state-led	land	reform	in	East	Asia	following	the	Second	World	War	
and	pinning	these	to	the	grassroots	Landless	Workers	Movement	in	Brazil,	they	forget	that	






There	are	a	number	of	other	 scholars	who	have	contributed	 to	 the	 literature	who	are	not	
mentioned	 above,	 but	 those	 that	 have	 been	 discussed,	 are	 broadly	 representative.	
Explanations	 for	 the	 variance	 of	 land	 redistribution	 across	 the	 four	 cases	 under	 study	 are	









inform	 a	 theory,	 but	 by	 themselves	 they	 are	 too	 determinate	 in	 nature.	 The	 existing	
literature	 is	 careful	 not	 to	 place	 too	much	 emphasis	 on	 path	 dependent	 explanations	 for	







future,	 eliminating	 the	 possibility	 of	 reform.	 He	 goes	 onto	 argue	 that	 Philippine	 cultural	
values	 have	 constrained	 class-based	 action	 among	 the	 peasantry	 by	 directing	 feelings	 of	
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affinity	along	other	axes,	including	personal	and	group	identifications	along	regional,	ethnic	
and	 linguistic	 lines,	 the	principle	of	utang	na	 loob	 (debt	of	gratitude)	and	patterns	of	 rural	
dependency	embodied	in	patron-client	relations.		
	
Putzel	 (1992)	 acknowledges	 that	 colonialism	has	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	modern	
Philippine	 state,	 but	 he	 correctly	 maintains	 that	 the	 pattern	 of	 land	 ownership	 on	 the	
archipelago	was	not	inevitable	and	is	subject	to	change.	While	careful	to	not	to	make	a	path	
dependent	argument,	Putzel	explains	that	the	impact	of	Japanese	colonialism	on	Korea	was	
the	 opposite	 to	 that	 of	 the	 Philippines.	 The	 Japanese	 authorities	 diluted	 the	 power	 of	
Yangban,	 a	 class	 of	 aristocrats	 who	 dominated	 Korea	 during	 the	 Yi	 Dynasty,	 making	 land	
redistribution	easier	to	 implement.	Putzel	does	not	suggest	that	different	colonial	histories	






East	 Asia,	 there	 is	 an	 absence	 of	 national	 unity	 and	 ambition	 in	 the	 Philippines.	 Filipinos	
identify	 strongly	 with	 their	 families	 or	 tribes,	 while	 others	 are	 treated	 as	 outsiders.	 For	
Fallows,	 this	 helps	 explain	 why	 landed	 elites	 have	 persistently	 undermined	 the	
implementation	 of	 land	 reform.	 Fallows’	 argues	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 national	 economic	




the	 later	 land	 redistribution	 program.	 Kay	 argues	 that	 the	 agriculture	 sector	 was	 in	 good	
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altered.	The	 landowners	were	not	directly	 involved	 in	 farming;	 this	was	 the	domain	of	 the	










appropriate.	 He	 argues	 that	 ethnic	 homogeneity	 and	 social	 cohesion	 made	 land	 reform	
easier	 to	 implement	 in	 Taiwan	 and	 South	 Korea.	 He	 does	 not	 claim	 that	 social	 cohesion	
explains	why	reform	was	initiated	(1989	in	Doner,	Ritchie	&	Slater	2005).				
	
Colonial	 histories	 and	 the	 ethnic	 make-up	 of	 the	 population	 in	 each	 of	 the	 cases	 likely	
impacted	the	implementation	of	land	reform,	but	these	factors	did	not	determine	whether	
or	not	it	would	be	instigated.	As	Ladejinsky	(1964)	explains,	there	is	no	doubt	that	patterns	
of	 land	 usage	 and	 customary	 relationships	 steeped	 in	 long	 history	 of	 social	 and	 religious	
traditions	play	a	role	in	the	design	and	implementation	of	policies,	such	as	land	reform,	that	
have	the	ability	to	transform	society,	but	“this	does	not	invalidate	the	main	premise-that	the	
content	 and	 implementation	 of	 agrarian	 reform	 are	 a	 reflection	 of	 a	 particular	 political	
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balance	 of	 forces	 in	 a	 country”	 (1964,	 p.	 8).	 The	 idea	 that	 it	 is	 the	 balance	 of	 forces	 in	 a	





redistribution	 schemes.	 Agency	 arguments	 place	 individual	 leaders	 at	 the	 center	 of	
explanations	 for	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 land	 reform.	 From	 this	 standpoint,	 government	
policy	on	 land	reform	is	principally	determined	by	the	character	and	dedication	of	political	





Writing	 from	 a	 liberal	 democratic	 perspective,	 Ghimire	 (2001)	 argues	 that	 successful	 land	
reform	requires	a	strong	commitment	on	the	part	of	 leaders	 in	both	grassroots	campaigns	
and	 in	 central	 government.	 Much	 of	 the	 book	 that	 Ghimire	 edits	 focuses	 on	 grassroots	
peasant	 movements.	 Such	 scholarship	 is	 not	 averse	 to	 making	 arguments	 based	 on	
normative	 ideals,	 however,	 it	 neglects	 the	 study	of	politics	 and	 the	balance	of	power	at	 a	
nation	state	level.	If	Ghimire	focused	on	the	agency	of	individuals	in	central	government,	it	
may	become	evident	that	governments	do	not	generally	seek	to	maximize	social	welfare.	To	













Tai	 (1974)	 draws	on	 the	 example	of	 President	Magsaysay	 in	 the	Philippines	 and	Governor	
Chen	 in	Taiwan	 to	argue	 for	 the	 importance	of	political	will	 in	 the	 implementation	of	 land	
reform.	Tai	argues	that	the	crucial	energy	behind	the	1955	Land	Tenure	Bill	in	the	Philippines	
was	 President	 Magsaysay.	 According	 to	 Tai,	 Magsaysay’s	 dedication	 to	 reform,	 and	 the	
strong	 rural	 base	 of	 support	 that	 he	 in	 turn,	 cultivated	 saw	 a	 number	 of	 resistant	
congressmen	 vote	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 legislation.	 Tai	 explains	 that	 Magsaysay	 became	 an	
advocate	 of	 land	 reform	 during	 the	 anti-Hukbalahap	 military	 campaign	 when	 he	 became	
more	 aware	 with	 the	 problems	 the	 peasantry	 was	 facing.	 He	 disagreed	 with	 the	military	
approach	 advocated	 by	 his	 predecessor,	 President	 Quirino,	 resigning	 as	 Secretary	 of	










President	 Marcos	 favored	 tenants	 at	 crucial	 points	 in	 the	 process	 and	 fully	 funded	 the	
Philippine	 bureaucracy	 to	 carry	 out	 land	 reform.	 He	 believed	 that	 “if	 [the	 Marcos	
Administration]	 could	wave	a	magic	wand	and	make	 land	 reform	occur	 instantly,	 it	would	
not	hesitate	to	wave	the	wand”	(p.	446-447).	Overholt	analyzes	whether	Marcos’	attempt	at	





Tai	 (1974)	also	picks	up	on	the	political	will	argument	 in	his	 study	of	 land	redistribution	 in	





While	the	overall	 theory	of	 land	reform	that	Tai	presents	 is	compelling,	 the	argument	that	
land	 reform	 in	 Taiwan	 may	 not	 have	 happened	 were	 it	 not	 for	 Governor	 Chen’s	 resolve	
seems	too	simplistic.		
	
Ladejinsky	 (1964)	argues	 that	were	 it	not	 for	 the	 individual	 actions	of	Governor	Chen,	 the	
promise	 of	 land	 reform	 in	 Mainland	 China,	 the	 threat	 of	 insurgency	 and	 need	 for	 social	
stability	alone	may	not	have	sufficed	to	bring	about	reform	in	Taiwan.		While	the	individual	
actions	of	Governor	Chen	were	 significant,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	move	beyond	a	 ‘political	will’	
argument	 in	 order	 to	 understand	where	 agency	derives	 from.	At	 certain	 points	 in	 history,	






Putzel	 (1992)	 makes	 a	 helpful	 critique	 of	 political	 agency	 arguments,	 stating	 that	 the	
presence	or	absence	of	‘political	will’	cannot	properly	explain	reform	or	lack	thereof.	He	uses	
the	example	of	the	Philippine	President	Magsaysay,	who	was	more	devoted	to	reform	than	
South	 Korean	 President	 Rhee.	While	 President	 Rhee	 oversaw	 the	 implementation	 of	 land	










Political	 instability	and	 legitimacy	building	theories	 focus	on	the	role	of	 inter-state	conflict,	
rebellion	or	civil	war	and	the	subsequent	need	for	legitimacy	building	reforms	to	explain	why	




have	“examined	the	 incentive	to	redistribute	 land	as	a	way	of	 forestalling	social	conflict	or	
revolution,”	 including	 Grossman	 (1994),	 Horowitz	 (1993)	 and	 Acemoglu	 and	 Robinson	
(2001).	Other	scholars	focus	more	specifically	on	the	cases	that	this	thesis	studies	and	make	
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Tuma	 (1965)	 makes	 an	 early	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 political	 instability,	
acknowledging	that	reform	is	instigated	to	restore	the	legitimacy	of	the	regime	and	tends	to	
only	 be	 discussed	 and	 implemented	 to	 the	 extent	 required	 to	 restore	 order.	 Drawing	 on	
Tuma’s	work,	Tai	 (1974)	places	 the	relationship	between	political	 instability	and	 legitimacy	
building	at	 the	 center	of	his	 argument.	 For	Tai,	 “political	 elites	 initiate	 reform	primarily	 to	
gain	political	 legitimacy”	 (1974,	p.	88-89).	He	goes	on	 to	explain	 that	 reform	 is	unlikely	 to	
occur	 unless	 those	 in	 power	 identify	 that	 they	 need	 to	 enhance	 their	 own	 legitimacy.	
Ledesma	 (1980a)	 states	 that	 the	 governments	 of	 the	 primarily	 agricultural	 countries	 of	
South-East	 and	 East	 Asia,	 which	 were	 facing	 population	 pressures	 and	 low	 levels	 of	 land	
ownership,	 turned	 to	 land	 reform	 to	bolster	popular	 support,	 generate	political	 legitimacy	
and	to	reject	the	legitimacy	of	domestic	rebellions	or	communist	revolutionaries.	He	argues	
that	 in	 this	 climate,	 the	 democratic	 nature	 of	 land	 reform	 appealed	 to	 leaders	 who	
recognized	 the	need	 to	broaden	 their	bases	of	 support.	 Leaders	used	democratic	 ideals	 to	





Scholars	 focus	on	 the	 specific	 threat	 communism	posed	 to	 the	 stability	of	 the	 state	 in	 the	
decades	following	the	Second	World	War	and	argue	that	land	reform	was	used	to	counteract	
this.	 There	 is	 a	 consensus	 among	 scholars	 that	 the	 threat	 of	 communist	 insurgency	 from	
Mainland	 China	 encouraged	 the	 KMT	 to	 implement	 land	 reform	 and	 develop	 strong	
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institutions	 to	 promote	 economic	 growth	 to	 solidify	 its	 legitimacy	 (You	 2014;	 Ledesma	
1980a;	Tai	1974;	Adams	1995;	Campos	and	Root	1996;	and	White	2012).	Tai	states	that	the	










Comparably,	 You	 (2014),	 Kay	 (2002)	 and	 Putzel	 (1992)	 argue	 that	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	
communists	 in	 the	 north	 of	 the	 Korean	 Peninsula	 played	 a	 critical	 role	 in	 advancing	 land	
redistribution	 in	 the	 south.	 You	 argues	 that	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 radical	 land	 reform	
program	in	the	communist	north	in	1946	incentivized	politicians	in	the	south	to	consider	this	
option.	He	explains	that	these	politicians	would	normally	be	opposed	to	land	redistribution,	
but	 that	 they	 chose	 to	 advocate	 for	 such	 a	 policy	 to	 broaden	 their	 appeal	 to	 the	 peasant	
population.	Kay	 reasons	 that	 the	main	 factor	 that	 led	 to	 land	 reform	 in	 the	south	was	 the	
need	 to	 nullify	 influence	 from	 the	 communist	 north	 and	 limit	 class	 conflict	 in	 order	 to	
stabilize	the	state.	Putzel	concurs,	stating	that	the	decision	to	redistribute	land	can	only	be	
understood	 in	 the	context	of	 the	threat	posed	by	communist	 forces	 in	 the	north	and	their	
effective	 land	 redistribution	 scheme.	He	argues	 that	 land	 reform	was	 critical	 for	President	
Rhee’s	 legitimacy	as	 leader	of	newly	 formed	South	Korea.	He	explains	 that	when	war	with	
the	north	broke	out,	President	Rhee	lost	much	popularity.	Land	reform	was	a	means	to	gain	





scholars	 argue	 that	 governments	 also	 had	 to	 confront	 internal	 threats	 to	 the	 state.	 It	 is	
argued	 that	 land	 reform	was	 initiated	 to	 stabilize	 the	 state	 and	 increase	 governing	 elites’	
legitimacy.	 You	 (2014)	 explains,	 while	 KMT	 rule	 was	 initially	 welcomed,	 the	 Taiwanese	




to	 the	 Philippines,	 arguing	 that	 in	 Taiwan	 the	 KMT	 had	 a	much	 stronger	 political	 need	 to	
satisfy	the	Taiwanese	population	as	it	had	only	recently	retreated	to	the	island	and	could	still	
be	considered	an	outside	force.	Tai	(1974)	disagrees	with	White,	stating	that	the	Hukbalahap	







a	 stable	military	 government	 and	 subsequent	 demonstrations	 by	 farmers	 made	 the	 issue	
politically	salient.	Ramsay	states	that	Prime	Minister	Sanya	used	the	promise	of	land	reform	







and	 You	 2014).	 The	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 United	 States’	 interests	 were	 threatened	 had	 a	
considerable	 impact	 on	 the	 position	 it	 took	 on	 land	 reform.	 The	 United	 States	 both	





calculated	 that	 land	 reform	 aligned	 with	 its	 broad	 interests	 and	 its	 involvement	 was	 an	
important	 factor	 behind	 the	 success	 of	 these	 programs.	 For	 example,	 Putzel	 argues	 that	
United	States’	officials,	such	as	Moyer	and	Ladejinsky,	performed	a	crucial	role	in	advancing	





In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Philippines,	 Putzel	 (1992)	 argues	 that	 the	United	 States	 only	 supported	
land	 redistribution	 when	 revolutionary	 movements	 threatened	 its	 economic	 and	 security	
interests	 in	 the	 archipelago	 and	 further	 afield.	 He	 explains	 that	 the	United	 States	 initially	
advocated	 for	 land	 reform	 in	 the	 Philippines	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Hukbalahap	 guerilla	
movement	 during	 Magsaysay’s	 Presidency,	 but	 withdrew	 its	 support	 once	 its	
counterinsurgency	 campaign	 succeeded	 to	 quash	 the	movement.	 Putzel	 states	 that	 it	was	





to	 explain,	 however,	 why	 wealth-sharing	 reforms	 were	 not	 introduced	 in	 other	 parts	 of	
world	witnessing	similar	levels	of	political	instability	(Centeno	1997).	Picking	up	on	this	point,	
Doner,	Ritchie	and	Slater	(2005)	build	and	refine	political	 instability	and	legitimacy	building	




are	 required	 for	 a	 ‘development	 state’	 to	 emerge.	 Doner	 et.	 al.	 argue	 that	 land	 reform	
implemented	by	KMT	 in	Taiwan	was	a	 response	to	 the	 threat	of	national	 reunification,	via	
communist	 infiltration,	with	Mainland	 China.	 Land	 reform	 gave	 the	 regime	 legitimacy	 and	
popular	 support.	 Had	 the	 regime	 not	 been	 facing	 ‘systemic	 vulnerability,’	 land	would	 not	
have	 redistributed	 in	 South	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan	 and	 the	 “developmental	 state”	 would	 not	





provide	 a	 partial	 answer	 as	 to	 why	 land	 reform	 was	 implemented	 in	 South	 Korea	 and	
Taiwan,	but	not	in	Thailand	and	the	Philippines.	The	argument	that	Doner	et.	al.	(2005)	make	
is	 helpful	 as	 it	 underscores	 the	 need	 for	 a	 multi-dimensional	 answer	 to	 the	 research	
question.	 While	 ‘Systemic	 vulnerability’	 is	 a	 valuable	 concept,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 explore	 or	






State	 capability	 theories	 focus	 on	 variables	 such	 as	 regime	 type,	 centralization	 of	 power,	
bureaucratic	 capacity	 and	 state	 capture	 versus	 state	 autonomy	 to	 explain	 the	 research	
question.	While	 linked,	these	four	variables	are	distinct	 from	each	other.	Scholars	studying	
the	 impact	of	 regime	 type	on	 the	 implementation	of	 land	 reform	 focus	on	 the	differences	
between	democratic	and	non-democratic	regimes.	Certain	scholars	draw	conclusions	around	
which	regime	type	is	best	suited	to	the	implementation	of	land	reform,	while	others	contend	
that	 regime	 type	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 research	 question.	 Scholars	 have	 also	written	 on	 the	
importance	of	centralized	power	and	bureaucratic	capacity	as	factors	that	have	contributed	





In	 those	 countries	where	 a	multiparty	 or	 bi-party	 system	 reigns,	 the	 prospect	 for	 prompt,	
effective,	and	drastic	land	reform	is	generally	not	bright.	In	countries	where	political	power	is	
concentrated	in	one	political	party	or	a	small	group	of	leaders,	and	where	the	elites	earnestly	
seek	 to	 broaden	 their	 rural	 base,	 the	 possibility	 of	 relatively	 successful	 reform	 is	 great	 (p.	
473).		
Tai	 goes	 on	 to	 explain	 why	 democratic	 regimes	 provide	 landed	 elites	 with	 a	 greater	
opportunity	 to	 halt	 reform,	 as	 opposed	 to	 authoritarian	 regimes.	 He	 explains	 that	 in	
‘competitive’	systems,	where	a	large	segment	of	the	population	is	comprised	of	agricultural	
laborers,	 politics	 is	 elite	 driven.	 Agricultural	 laborers	 or	 peasants	 tend	 to	 be	 aligned	 to	
different	 parties	 or	 candidates	 and	 find	 it	 difficult	 to	 effectively	 advocate	 for	 their	 own	
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interests.	 He	 observes	 that	 there	 is	 less	 of	 a	 desire	 to	 use	 land	 reform	 to	 support	 the	
legitimacy	of	the	regime	because	the	elite	is	divided	over	the	need	for	reform.	In	the	case	of	
‘non-competitive’	systems,	Tai	states	that	regimes	are	not	broadly	based,	as	they	do	not	rely	
on	 electoral	 support.	 Nonetheless,	 when	 considering	 land	 reform,	 the	 small	 numbers	 of	
decision-makers	 in	 ‘non-competitive’	 systems	 are	 likely	 to	 agree	 to	 broaden	 their	 support	
base	to	include	the	peasantry.	He	cites	the	KMT	driven	land	reform	in	Taiwan	as	an	example	
of	this.	Tai	appears	to	mischaracterize	the	issue.	Whether	a	regime	is	‘competitive’	or	‘non-









Agrarian	 Reform,	 and	 to	 fund	 that	 department	 fully.	 It	 enabled	 him	 to	 declare	 strong	
measures	against	bureaucrats	and	judges	whose	decisions	sabotaged	land	reform	(p.	446).		
While	 it	may	 have	 been	 difficult	 to	 discern	 at	 the	 time,	 President	Marcos	 had	 little	more	
autonomy	 from	 landed	 elites	 than	 previous	 Philippine	 presidents,	 which	 was	 ultimately	
demonstrated	by	his	 inability	 to	 implement	 land	 reform.	Overholt	blurs	 the	 importance	of	
governing	 elites	 having	 the	 necessary	 autonomy	 from	 landed	 interests	 with	 regime	 type.	
Putzel	 (1992)	 helpfully	 explains	 that	 mere	 presence	 of	 an	 authoritarian	 regime	 does	 not	
necessarily	mean	that	land	reform	will	be	easier	to	implement.	For	Putzel,	President	Marcos’	




In	 contrast	 to	 the	 argument	 made	 by	 Tai	 (1974)	 and	 Overholt	 (1976),	 Riedinger	 (1995)	
argues	 that	 the	 Philippine	 experience	 demonstrates	 that	 democracy	 is	more	 conducive	 to	
land	reform:		
The	 Philippine	 case	 suggests	 that	 authoritarian	 rule	 is	 neither	 sufficient	 nor	 necessary	 to	
effectuate	 an	 appreciable	 measure	 of	 redistributive	 reform.	 However,	 flawed	 and	
incomplete,	 the	 new	 Philippine	 democracy	 has	 proven	 more	 conducive	 to	 redistributive	
reform	than	its	authoritarian	predecessor	(p.	233).		
Perhaps	 it	 was	 also	 difficult	 for	 Riedinger	 to	 discern	 at	 the	 time	 that	 President	 Aquino’s	
effort	to	redistribute	 land	would	turn	out	to	be	as	equally	 ineffective	as	President	Marcos’	
attempt.	 Overall,	 regime	 type	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 explain	 why	 we	 see	 variance	 in	 the	
implementation	of	land	reform.	
	
Moving	 to	 the	 second	 variable	 discussed	 under	 state	 capability,	 Tai	 (1974)	 argues	 that	
centralized	 authority	 contributed	 to	 the	 successful	 redistribution	 of	 land	 in	 Taiwan.	 He	
explains	 that	 power	 was	 concentrated	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 KMT,	 which	meant	 it	 had	 the	
ability	 to	 design	 the	 reform	 program	 and	 implement	 it	 with	 little	 resistance.	 This	may	 be	
partially	attributed	 to	 the	KMT’s	 centralized	 rule,	but	 it	 appears	 there	are	other	 factors	at	





the	bureaucrats	 charged	with	 implementing	 reform	at	 a	 local	 government	 level.	 The	 Land	
Reform	 Act	 in	 1975	 did	 not	 make	 any	 headway,	 as	 it	 required	 coercion	 to	 ensure	 its	
successful	implementation.	Local	landed	elites,	whose	interests	would	be	harmed	if	reforms	
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were	 implemented,	 allied	 with	 local	 bureaucrats,	 including	 village	 heads,	 district	 officers,	
police	 and	 land	 registrars	 to	 limit	 implementation	 of	 the	 legislation.	 Ladejinsky	 (1964)	
explains	that	 it	 is	crucial	 for	the	central	state	to	have	a	monopoly	on	violence	because	the	
threat,	and	at	times	use,	of	compulsion	is	generally	inescapable	if	large-scale	land	reform	is	
to	be	effectively	implemented.	Morell	and	Chai-Anan	argue:		




In	 the	 case	of	 the	Philippines,	 Ladejinsky	argues	 that	 the	existence	of	private	armies	 is	 an	






records,	 unreliable	 credit	 sources	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 government	 personnel	 on	 the	 ground	 all	
undermine	the	 implementation	of	 land	reform.	The	role	of	 the	state	 is	crucial	 for	practical	
reasons,	 for	 example	 undertaking	 cadastral	 surveys	 and	providing	 technical	 and	monetary	
assistance	(Ghimire	2001).	Quisumbing	and	Adriano	explain	further:	






land	 tenure	 data	 and	 the	 non-indigenous	 bureaucracy	 that	 had	 accompanied	 President	
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Chiang	 Kai-shek”	 (1995,	 p.	 3).	 Adams’	 argument	 alludes	 to	 more	 than	 bureaucratic	
capability;	 it	 highlights	 the	 likely	 autonomy	of	 the	 non-indigenous	 bureaucracy	 from	 large	
landowners.	 Perhaps	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	 bureaucracy,	 as	 opposed	 to	 its	 capability,	
contributed	more	to	the	implementation	of	land	reform	in	Taiwan.			
	





reform	 was	 implemented	 following	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 although	 it	 has	 improved	
measurably	since.		
	
A	 1993	 World	 Bank	 report	 suggested	 the	 Filipino	 bureaucracy	 lacked	 the	 cohesion	 to	
implement	 and	 enforce	 the	 complex	 land	 reform	 legislation	 passed	 under	 the	 Aquino	
Administration.	Kuhonta	(2011)	argues	that	the	Philippine	bureaucracy	was	fragmented	and	
undisciplined,	which	 impacted	President	Aquino’s	ability	 to	 implement	widespread	reform.	
Kuhonta	 goes	 on	 to	 note	 that	 President	 Aquino	 could	 have	 done	 more,	 however,	 to	
strengthen	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 state	 apparatus	 in	 order	 to	 give	 agrarian	 reform	 a	 better	
chance	of	succeeding.	Kuhonta	stops	short	of	suggesting	that	the	Philippine	bureaucracy	was	
not	 strong	 enough	 to	 implement	 land	 reform	 because	 it	 had	 been	 captured	 by	 landed	
interests,	but	it	appears	that	this	may	have	been	the	case.		
	
Riedinger	 (1995)	 found	 that	 “Philippine	 agrarian	 reform	 is	 open	 to	 abuses	 as	 landowners	
alter	 their	 landownership	 records	 and	 cropping	 patterns	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 avoid	 reform”	 (p.	
181).	Conning	and	Robinson	(2001)	argue:	
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In	 countries	 where	 per	 capita	 land	 inequality	 is	 highest,	 there	 is	 a	 greater	 incentive	 to	
challenge	 property	 rights	 via	 the	 political	 system,	 and	 this	makes	 landlords	more	 likely	 to	
organize	agriculture	in	a	politically	defensive	manner,	by	limiting	tenancy	(p.	4).		












can	 deny;	 but	 reforms	 cannot	 be	 “researched”	 or	 “studied”	 into	 existence.	 Of	 far	 greater	
importance	 is	 the	 acceptance	 of	 the	 reform	 idea,	 to	 begin	 with,	 in	 such	 a	 manner	 that	
technical	problems	are	not	an	excuse	for	inaction,	but	something	to	be	resolved.	There	is	no	
country	in	Asia,	however,	undeveloped,	which	does	not	know	how	to	write	a	reform	law,	or	
what	 its	 implications	might	 be.	 They	 have	written	 them,	 and	many	 have	 not	 been	 carried	
out-precisely	 because	 the	 political	 decision-makers	 understood	 their	 implications	 and	
inevitable	repercussions	(p.	8).		
The	final	variable	discussed	in	this	section,	state	capture,	may	explain	why	land	reform	has	




Moving	 to	 the	 final	 variable	 under	 state	 capability,	 the	 impact	 of	 state	 capture	 or	 state	
autonomy	on	a	government’s	ability	to	implement	land	reform	is	alluded	to	frequently	in	the	
literature,	 but	 few	 scholars	 discuss	 it	 detail.	When	 state	 capture	 or	 state	 autonomy	 does	
feature	it	does	not	have	a	strong	theoretical	basis.	Scholars	have	a	tendency	to	cite	empirical	
examples	to	argue	that	 if	a	state	 is	captured	by	 landed	interests,	 land	reform	is	unlikely	to	
occur.	Tai	(1974)	makes	the	largest	contribution	to	the	literature	on	state	capture	and	state	
autonomy	by	investigating	the	relationship	between	large	landowners	and	governments.	He	
explains	 overwhelmingly	 it	 is	 the	 compromise	 sought	 between	 the	 government	 and	 large	
landowners	 that	 determines	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 land	 reform.	 He	 notes	 that	 large	







that	 had	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 from	 large	 landowners	 (Tai	 1974;	 Putzel	 1992;	 You	
2014).	The	literature	places	South	Korea	in	the	middle	of	the	Philippines	and	Taiwan.	Putzel	
(1992)	and	You	 (2014)	explain	 that	 the	American	Military	Government	was	 insulated	 from	
large	 landowners	 in	 the	 south	 of	 the	 Korean	 Peninsula,	which	made	 it	 straightforward	 to	
implement	 the	 first	 wave	 of	 land	 reform.	 You	 demonstrates,	 however,	 that	 unlike	 the	
American	Military	Government,	President	Rhee’s	administration	did	not	enjoy	a	high	level	of	




cite.	Chapter	Three	seeks	 to	build	a	 theory	 to	help	situate	 the	notion	 that	state	capture	 is	
detrimental	to	the	implementation	of	land	reform,	while	state	autonomy	is	facilitative.		
	
Of	 the	 four	 state	 capability	 theories,	 the	 discussion	 on	 state	 capture	 and	 state	 autonomy	
appears	to	provide	the	most	convincing	explanation	of	why	land	reform	was	implemented	in	
some	 cases,	 but	 not	 in	 others.	While	 the	 effect	 of	 regime	 type	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	
land	reform	does	not	seem	to	be	a	significant	variable,	it	is	heavily	debated	in	the	literature	
surveyed,	 which	 makes	 further	 investigation	 sensible.	 The	 degree	 to	 which	 a	 state	 is	
centralized	does	appear	to	have	an	impact	on	the	implementation	of	land	reform,	but	state	
centralization	 in	and	of	 itself	 is	not	an	explanation	of	why	 land	 reform	occurs	or	does	not	
occur,	so	it	will	not	be	explored	further.	Bureaucratic	capacity	seems	to	have	an	impact	on	
whether	land	reform	is	 implemented	successfully,	however,	similar	to	centralized	power,	 it	




The	 usefulness	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 politics	 of	 land	 reform	 covering	 the	 Philippines,	
Thailand,	 South	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan	 is	 varied.	 Path	 dependent	 and	 agency	 theories	 do	 not	
provide	 an	 adequate	 answer	 to	 the	 research	 question.	 The	 former	 cannot	 by	 definition	
determine	whether	or	not	 land	reform	will	be	 implemented	and	the	 later	 fail	 to	 recognize	
the	 incentives	 that	 inform	 the	 political	 decision-making	 process.	 Theories	 on	 political	
instability	 and	 legitimacy	 building	may	 provide	 a	 partial	 answer	 as	 to	 why	 land	 reform	 is	
implemented	in	some	cases,	but	not	others.	Alone,	they	do	not	account	for	the	relationship	
between	 those	 deciding	 to	 implement	 land	 reform	 and	 those	 who	 own	 land.	 It	 is	 this	
relationship	 that	 appears	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 state	 has	 the	 requisite	 autonomy	 to	
redistribute	 land.	 In	 summary,	 political	 instability	 together	 with	 state	 autonomy	 seem	 to	
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explain	 why	 land	 reform	 was	 implemented	 in	 South	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan,	 but	 not	 in	 the	















of	 the	 fundamental	 power	 relation	between	 the	governors	 and	 the	governed	 in	 its	
society	–	Downs	1957	
	
The	 literature	discussed	 in	 the	preceding	 chapter	demonstrates	 that	a	number	of	 scholars	
have	 attempted,	 both	 directly	 and	 indirectly,	 to	 explain	 variation	 in	 land	 reform	 across	
Taiwan,	 South	 Korea,	 Thailand	 and	 the	 Philippines.	 Some	 of	 these	 explanations	 resonate,	
while	 others	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 fully	 explain	 why	 land	 reform	 is	 implemented	 in	 some	
countries,	but	not	others.	While	not	all	of	his	arguments	are	helpful,	Hung-chao	Tai	 (1974)	
provides	 the	 most	 convincing	 explanation,	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	
legitimacy	 building	 and	 class	 coalitions.	 Empirically	 Tai’s	 explanation	 appears	 to	 ring	 true,	







to	 maximize	 their	 self-interest.8	The	 decision	 to	 implement	 land	 reform	 is	 based	 on	 the	
																																																								
8	This	thesis	draws	on	the	1957	work	of	Antony	Downs	to	explain	the	concept	of	self-interest	 in	the	context	of	
government.	 For	 Downs,	 governing	 elites	 maximize	 their	 self-interest	 by	 acquiring	 the	 income,	 power	 and	
prestige	that	go	with	office.		
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incentives	governing	elites	 face.	 If	 the	 implementation	of	 land	reform	will	undermine	their	




are	no	guarantees	 that	governing	elites	would	be	motivated	to	pursue	 it	 (Downs	1957).	 In	
the	 context	 of	 land	 reform,	 for	 example,	 it	 has	 been	 recognized	 that	 the	 redistribution	of	
land	 would	 advance	 socio-economic	 development	 in	 Thailand	 and	 the	 Philippines,	 yet	
governing	elites	have	failed	to	act.	
	
Politics	confines	governing	elites	and	creates	 incentives	 that	can	result	 in	 the	alignment	of	
their	self-interest	with	the	 interests	of	 the	citizenry,	or	certain	segments	of	 it.	Like	all	 self-
maximizing	individuals,	governing	elites	can	still	serve	the	wider	interests	of	society	by	acting	
in	 their	 self-interest.9	The	 social	 function	 of	 political	 parties,	 which	 is	 to	 create	 and	






Applying	 this	 theory	 of	 institutionalized	 democratic	 government	 to	 non-democracies	 and	
uninstitutionalized	democracies,	the	likelihood	that	governing	elites	desire	to	acquire	power	
will	align	with	the	creation	and	implementation	of	specific	policies	becomes	more	uncertain.	
Taiwan,	 South	 Korea,	 Thailand	 and	 the	 Philippines	 would	 not	 be	 deemed	 institutional	
democracies	during	the	period	land	was	implemented	in	the	case	of	Taiwan	and	South	Korea	
																																																								
9	This	 concept	 forms	 the	basis	 of	 economic	 theory.	Adam	Smith’s	 theory	of	 the	division	of	 labor	 explains	 that	
when	individuals	pursue	their	own	needs,	they	simultaneously	carry	out	social	functions.		
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or	 discussed	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Thailand	 and	 the	 Philippines.	 Governing	 elites	 in	 oligarchic	 or	
autocratic	 systems	 still	maintain	 their	 support	base	 just	as	political	parties	must	appeal	 to	
voters,	 but	 this	 base	 is	 often	 smaller	 than	 in	 an	 institutionalized	 democracy.	 While	 the	
support	base	is	likely	to	benefit	from	their	pursuit	and	maintenance	of	power,	the	welfare	of	
wider	 society	 can	 more	 easily	 be	 neglected.	 Writing	 reform	 law	 and	 understanding	 its	
implications	is	something	that	all	countries,	wealthy	and	poor,	can	accomplish.	However,	the	
implementation	 of	 these	 laws	 is	 a	 hurdle	 which	 most	 cannot	 leap	 due	 to	 the	 powerful	
opposition	of	landed	elites.		
“They	have	written	them,	and	many	may	not	have	been	carried	out	–	precisely	because	the	
political	 decision-makers	 understood	 their	 implications	 and	 their	 inevitable	 repercussions”	
(Ladejinsky	1964,	p.454).			




make	 in	 their	 self-interest.	 It	 is	 dependent	 on	 whether	 the	 support	 base	 of	 the	 political	
party,	 group	 of	 oligarchs,	 or	 authoritarian	 leader,	 in	 question,	 will	 benefit	 from	 the	
redistribution	 of	 land.	 Despite	 the	 possibility	 that	 private	motive	 and	 public	 good	 can	 be	
complementary,	 we	 cannot	 always	 assume	 that	 the	 behavior	 of	 governments	 is	 socially	
optimal	any	more	than	we	can	assume	that	a	firm	creates	a	socially	optimal	output	(Downs	
1957).	From	the	perspective	of	governing	elites,	land	reform	is	a	means	to	an	end.	Governing	
elites	 will	 not	 implement	 land	 reform	 if	 it	 will	 not	 maximize	 their	 income,	 power	 and	
prestige.	
	
It	 is	 not	 often	 in	 the	 self-interest	 of	 governing	 elites	 to	 enforce	 efficient	 property	 rights	
because	 it	 is	 easier	 to	 simply	 grant	 monopoly	 property	 rights	 to	 powerful	 groups.	 The	
‘transaction	 cost’	 involved	 in	 monitoring	 property	 rights,	 creating	 suitably	 complex	 tax	
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regimes,	 and	 collecting	 taxes,	 is	 greater	 than	 the	 potential	 revenue	 earned	 by	 governing	
elites.	 Secondly,	 governing	 elites	 face	 a	 ‘competitive	 cost’	 as	 powerful	 groups	 that	 are	
economically	 disadvantaged	 by	 an	 efficient	 property	 rights	 regime,	 which	 does	 not	 serve	
their	interests,	have	the	ability	to	overthrow	and	replace	governing	elites	(North	1981).		
	
If	 an	 economy	 is	 heavily	 reliant	 on	 agricultural	 output,	 landed	 elites	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 a	
powerful	group	in	society.	Under	such	circumstances,	the	elites	who	control	agrarian	output	
also	 control	 the	 surplus,	 the	 export	 income,	 or	 import	 subsidies.	 For	 this	 reason,	
governments	 become	 economically	 reliant	 upon	 landed	 elites.	 In	 a	 country	 with	 stronger	
manufacturing	and	services	sectors,	 landed	elites	will	not	be	nearly	as	powerful,	but	at	the	
same	time,	nor	will	land	reform	be	as	relevant	(Herring	1983).		
It	 is	almost	a	 tautology	 to	point	out	 that	 in	most	 societies	 in	need	of	agrarian	 reform,	 it	 is	
likely	that	landowners	have	considerable	influence	over	the	state	(Putzel	1992,	p.375).		
Overall,	governing	elites	act	to	advance	their	self-interest	and	it	is	easier	for	them	to	create	
property	 rights	 regimes	 that	 are	 uncomplicated	 to	 administer	 and	 sympathetic	 to	 the	
interests	of	powerful	groups.	It	is	hard	to	find	a	society	in	need	of	land	reform,	where	landed	
elites	 are	 not	 a	 powerful	 group	 with	 considerable	 influence	 over	 governing	 elites.	 Under	








powerful	 (North	 1981).	 If	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 current	 regime	 is	 an	 imminent	 possibility,	
landed	 elites	 themselves	 may	 opt	 for	 coalitions	 to	 be	 broadened	 and	 land	 reform	 to	 be	
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implemented.	 For	 landed	elites,	being	 compensated	 for	 the	 loss	of	 their	 land,	even	 if	 at	 a	
rate	below	market	value,	 is	more	advantageous	than	 land	being	forcibly	removed	during	a	








type,	 which	 means	 that	 whether	 is	 country	 has	 a	 democratic,	 oligarchic	 or	 authoritarian	
regime,	 this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 determine	 whether	 land	 reform	 will	 be	 implemented.	 It	 may	
initially	be	appealing	to	argue	the	opposite	because	regime	type	is	a	relevant	variable	across	
the	four	cases	under	study,	but	on	closer	inspection,	regime	type	does	not	appear	to	explain	




All	 governing	 elites,	 whether	 they	 are	 operating	 within	 democratic	 or	 non-democratic	
regimes,	 rely	 on	 bases	 of	 support	 from	 society	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	 their	 power.	 Special	









support	 bases	 tend	 to	 be	 narrower	 than	 in	 an	 institutionalized	 democracy.	 Autocrats	 and	
oligarchs	are	acutely	aware	that	 if	 they	 fail	 to	serve	their	base,	 they	will	be	removed	from	
power.	As	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter,	in	countries	in	need	of	land	reform,	landed	elites	
are	 likely	 to	 influence	 those	 that	 govern.	 The	 common	 preoccupation	 of	 scholarship	with	








make	and	 implement	decisions	 free	 from	external	 control	or	 influence.	As	outlined	above,	
governing	elites	rely	on	support	bases	in	society	to	maintain	their	position,	but	the	extent	of	
this	reliance	is	always	a	matter	of	degree.	Certain	regimes	are	heavily	indebted	to	groups	in	
society	and	have	 little	 room	to	maneuver.	Other	 regimes	might	be	built	on	 the	back	of	an	





The	 relationship	 between	 governing	 elites	 and	 landed	 elites	 is	 significant	 because	 landed	
elites	 tend	 to	 be	 educated	 and	 as	 a	 result	 are	 able	 to	 articulate	 their	 demands	 more	
effectively	 than	 other	 groups	 in	 society,	 such	 as	 peasants	 (Tai	 1974).	 In	 addition,	 and	 as	
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discussed	earlier,	North	(1981)	and	Putzel	(1994)	explain	that	landed	elites	are	also	likely	to	
be	 powerful	 members	 of	 society,	 especially	 in	 countries	 in	 need	 of	 land	 reform.	 When	
landed	 elites	 stand	 to	 lose	 their	 land	 and	 the	 influence	 that	 stems	 from	 it,	 they	 will	 be	
inclined	 to	 resist	 land	 reform	and	 redistribution	 is	 likely	 to	 be	minimal.	 If	 governing	 elites	
rely	on	landed	elites	to	perpetuate	their	rule,	they	will	be	unlikely	to	implement	land	reform.	
Falling	 short	 of	 an	 agrarian	 revolution,	 if	 governing	 elites	 are	 independent	 of	 large	
landowners	 it	 is	 more	 likely	 that	 they	 will	 implement	 effective	 reforms	 (Tai	 1974).	 It	 is	
assumed	that	there	is	a	correlation	between	the	source	of	governing	elites’	power	and	the	
policies	 that	 they	 choose	 to	 implement;	 ultimately,	 no	 group	 of	 elites	 will	 legislate	
themselves	out	of	power	(Ledesma	1980a).			
	
The	 relationship	 between	 governing	 elites	 and	 agricultural	 laborers	 or	 tenants	 does	 not	
seem	 to	 be	 significant	 to	 the	 land	 reform	 equation.	 Peasants	 are	 unlikely	 to	 attain	 the	





Even	 if	 peasants	 are	 not	 coerced	 to	 vote	 a	 certain	 way,	 many	 peasants	 vote	 in	 terms	 of	
perceived	 patronage	 (Riedinger	 1995).	 Elections	 are	 a	 “conservative	 device,	which	 gives	 a	











case	 studies	 in	 the	 following	 chapter,	 Chapter	 Four.	 The	 first	 aspect	 of	 the	 theory	 is	 the	
assumption	 that	 under	 normal	 circumstances,	 land	 reform	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 in	 the	 self-
interest	of	governing	elites.	While	this	broadly	applies,	the	second	aspect	of	the	theory	is	the	




likely	 to	 determine	 the	 extent	 of	 land	 reform.	 Together	 these	 assumptions	 come	 to	
represent	 the	 theory	 on	 the	 politics	 of	 land	 reform:	 that	 land	 reform	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	



























This	 thesis	 will	 utilize	 qualitative	methodology	 largely	 because	 the	 politics	 of	 land	 reform	




than	 competitive.	 Qualitative	 studies	 usually	 focus	 on	 a	 smaller	 number	 of	 cases	 than	
quantitative	studies,	but	 this	allows	 the	 researcher	 to	conduct	a	more	 in-depth	analysis	of	
the	given	phenomena.	Whether	a	case	study,	area	study	or	comparative	study,	the	detailed	
information	unearthed	can	be	used	 to	develop	 theories.	Quantitative	 studies	 test	 theories	
developed	 by	 qualitative	 studies	 on	 a	 greater	 number	 of	 cases.	 They	 employ	 the	 use	 of	









reform.	 At	 the	 heart	 of	 all	 social	 science	 is	 comparison.	 It	 is	 through	 comparison	 that	we	




historical	 events,	 it	 draws	 on	 the	 comparative	 historical	 method	 utilized	 by	 the	 likes	 of	
Barrington	Moore	in	his	seminary	work,	Social	Origins	of	Dictatorship	and	Democracy	(1966)	





just	 as	 more	 detailed	 maps	 are	 necessary	 for	 others.	 No	 one	 seeking	 a	 preliminary	
orientation	to	the	terrain	wants	to	know	the	location	of	every	house	or	footpath.	Still,	if	one	
explores	 on	 foot…the	 details	 are	 what	 one	 learns	 first.	 Their	 meaning	 and	 relationship	
emerges	only	gradually	(1966,	p.	xx).		
New	and	useful	theories	emerge	from	the	study	of	political	phenomena	from	a	comparative	
perspective.	 The	 case	 study	method,	which	 involves	 the	detailed	 study	of	 a	 single	 case	 to	
answer	 a	 research	 question,	 provides	 valuable	 information	 on	 which	 comparative	 works	
draw	heavily,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 have	 the	 same	explanatory	 power	 as	 comparative	methods.	
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The	act	of	comparing	also	offers	an	opportunity	 to	 test	 the	validity	of	previously	accepted	
explanations	(Moore	1966).	Without	being	able	to	generalize,	it	is	difficult	to	build	and	test	











carefully	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 theory	 and	 evidence	 and	 it	 is	 the	 historical	
















This	 thesis	 employs	 a	Most	 Similar	 Systems	 Design	 to	 select	 and	 compare	 the	 four	 cases	
under	 study	 to	 determine	 why	 land	 reform	 has	 occurred	 in	 some,	 but	 not	 others.	 Most	
Similar	Systems	Design	involves	comparing	similar	cases,	which	only	differ	in	the	dependent	
variable:	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 land	 reform	 has	 been	 implemented.	 Through	 a	 process	 of	
elimination,	the	remaining	differences	amongst	the	similar	countries	can	be	used	to	explain	
why	 land	 reform	 has	 been	 implemented	 in	 only	 two	 of	 the	 four	 cases	 this	 thesis	 studies	
(Huang,	Kuo	and	Stockton	2002).			
	
South	 Korea,	 Taiwan,	 Thailand	 and	 the	 Philippines	 are	 ideal	 cases	 to	 explore	 in	 order	 to	
understand	 variation	 in	 land	 redistribution.	 At	 the	 close	 of	 the	 Second	World	War,	 there	
were	 a	 number	of	 political	 and	economic	 similarities	 between	 them.	 Taiwan,	 South	Korea	
and	 the	Philippines	 endured	 significant	 periods	 of	 colonial	 rule	 prior	 to	 the	 Second	World	
War,	albeit	they	were	not	subjected	to	the	same	colonial	master.	On	this	measure,	Thailand	
is	an	outlier	because	 it	was	never	colonized.	 In	all	 four	 cases,	 the	 Japanese	occupied	 their	
territory	during	the	Second	World	War.	Throughout	the	Cold	War,	the	timing	of	which	aligns	
with	 the	 time	 period	 under	 study,	 all	 four	 countries	 aligned	 themselves	 with	 the	 United	
States,	 as	 opposed	 to	 Russia	 or	 China,	 unlike	 a	 number	 of	 other	 countries	 in	 the	 region.	
When	land	reform	was	being	considered	at	different	times	in	South	Korea,	Thailand	and	the	
Philippines	all	three	cases	experienced	democracy,	although	the	degree	to	which	democracy	
was	 institutionalized	 in	 any	 of	 these	 cases	 is	 questionable.	 Taiwan	 was	 not	 a	 democracy	
when	 land	reform	was	 implemented,	nor	was	what	was	to	become	South	Korea	when	the	
American	 Military	 Government	 implemented	 the	 first	 wave	 of	 land	 reform,	 or	 the	
	 56	
Philippines	 when	 President	 Marcos	 attempted	 to	 redistribute	 land.	 South	 Korea,	 Taiwan,	
Thailand	and	the	Philippines	were	all	relatively	poor	prior	to	World	War	II.	Economically,	all	
four	countries	were	all	hurt	by	the	war.	In	electing	to	study	these	four	cases,	it	is	significant	





the	 Philippines	 during	 all	 land	 reform	 attempts	 from	 the	 1950s	 up	 until	 present	 day.	 It	 is	
acknowledged	 that	 this	 may	 weaken	 the	 comparison	 given	 the	 changed	 external	
environment	 in	 which	 the	 question	 of	 land	 reform	 was	 being	 considered.	 Figure	 III:	 Key	





be	obtained	through	secondary	source	material.	Given	the	 limited	scope	of	 this	 thesis	and	




















































elites	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	motivated	 to	 implement	 policies	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 society	 unless	
these	policies	align	with	their	self-interest.	Under	normal	circumstances,	 it	 is	assumed	that	







rights	 to	 land,	 both	 to	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 administering	more	 complicated	property	 rights	
and,	 significantly,	 to	 ensure	 that	 powerful	 landed	 elites	 continue	 to	 support	 successive	
Philippine	 governments.	While	 the	 period	 under	 study	 dates	 from	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Second	









During	 the	 Spanish	 colonial	 period,	 land	was	 controlled	 by	 a	 small	 number	 of	 people	 and	




despite	 being	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 issues	 arising	 from	 landlessness.	 From	 the	 outset	 of	
American	colonialism,	the	United	States	resisted	the	redistribution	of	land.	For	example,	the	
sale	of	 the	 friar	 lands	at	 the	 turn	of	 the	 twentieth	century	was	managed	by	 the	state	as	a	
market	 transaction.	 The	 friar	 lands	 were	 sold	 at	 too	 high	 a	 price	making	 land	 ownership	
unattainable	 for	 tenants.	 Through	 this	 process,	 landed	 elites	 acquired	 more	 land.	 The	






2001).	 The	 dominance	 of	 landed	 elites	 in	 the	 Philippines	 continued	 during	 the	 Japanese	
occupation.	The	Japanese	made	the	decision	to	not	redistribute	 land	 in	return	for	 landlord	
allegiance	(Putzel	1992).	All	of	these	examples	support	the	theory	that	governing	elites	are	
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longer	 the	 colonial	 master	 it	 maintained	 a	 strategic	 and	 commercial	 interest	 in	 the	
Philippines.	 It	appeared	to	be	 in	 the	United	States’	 interest	 to	uphold	a	system	whereby	a	
few	owned	the	majority	of	land	in	the	Philippines.	Peasants	formed	the	main	opposition	to	
the	 Japanese,	 while	 landlords	 and	 the	 military	 defected.	 After	 the	 war	 ended	 it	 was	 the	
latter	 groups	 who	 benefitted	 from	 American	 imperialism.	 The	 United	 States	 wanted	 to	
reestablish	 export	 agriculture	 and	 upholding	 the	 power	 of	 the	 landed	 elites	was	 the	 best	
means	 to	 achieve	 this.	 The	 Bell	 Trade	 Act,	 signed	 in	 October	 1945,	 reinstated	 free	 trade	
between	 the	Philippines	and	 the	United	States.	The	Philippine	market	was	 inundated	with	
imports	resulting	 in	a	 foreign	exchange	deficit.	The	 International	Monetary	Fund	 identified	
this	in	1950,	stating	that	free	trade	was	having	a	negative	impact	on	the	Filipino	economy	as	
a	whole,	with	only	 large	 landowners	engaged	 in	export-orientated	growth	profiting	 (Putzel	
1992).	
	
President	Magsaysay	went	 further	 than	most	politicians	 in	 the	Philippines	on	 land	 reform,	
explicitly	calling	for	the	expropriation	of	 land	 in	a	number	of	his	speeches	during	the	1953	
Presidential	 election.	While	 all	 three	main	 parties	 competing	 in	 this	 election	 talked	 about	
their	 support	 for	 land	 reform,	 which	 is	 not	 uncommon	 in	 Philippine	 politics,	 President	
Magsaysay	appeared	to	be	sincerely	concerned	about	the	plight	of	peasants	(Starner	1961),	
but	it	is	difficult	to	determine	if	this	was	more	than	rhetoric.	Ultimately,	landlord	obstruction	
meant	 that	 President	 Magsaysay’s	 1954	 land	 reform	 legislation	 was	 not	 implemented.	





Despite	 his	 rhetoric	 to	 the	 contrary,	 President	 Marcos	 understood	 that	 widespread	 land	






The	 story	 was	 similar	 in	 post-Marcos	 Philippines	 under	 President	 Corazon	 Aquino,	 who	
promised	to	 implement	 land	reform	during	her	election	campaign.	President	Aquino	had	a	
saintly	 image	 in	 the	 Philippines	 and	 a	 real	 opportunity	 to	 address	 the	 problem	 of	
landlessness.	 Even	 with	 emergency	 powers,	 she	 did	 not	 successfully	 legislate	 for	 wide-
ranging	 land	redistribution.	President	Aquino,	herself	a	member	of	a	powerful	 landholding	
family,	did	not	want	to	undermine	the	status	quo,	which	would	hurt	the	economic	interests	
of	 those	 closest	 to	 her	 (Fallows	 1994).	 If	 land	 redistribution	 was	 in	 the	 self-interest	 of	
Aquino,	she	could	have	done	more	to	strengthen	the	capacity	of	the	state	apparatus	and	the	
party	 that	 she	 was	 linked	 to,	 which	 would	 have	 given	 land	 reform	 a	 better	 chance	 of	
succeeding	(Kuhonta	2011).		
	
Overall,	 wide-ranging	 land	 reform	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Philippines	 was	 not	 acted	 on.	
Economic	 and	 social	 justice	 arguments	 in	 support	 of	 land	 reform	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 carry	
weight	with	governing	elites	or	landed	elites.	It	was	only	in	times	when	governing	elites’	hold	




In	 Thailand,	 in	 the	 decades	 following	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 Prime	 Minister	 Sanya	 was	
under	 political	 pressure	 from	 farmers	 and	 students	 to	 reform	 the	 rural	 economy	 by	
introducing	 land	 reform.	 The	 1975	 Thai	 Agricultural	 Land	 Reform	 Act,	 disbursed	 this	
pressure,	 but	 was	 drafted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 allow	 for	 numerous	 loopholes.	 “The	 law’s	
designers	 did	 not	 intend	 for	 land	 reform	 to	 result	 in	 the	 rapid	 and	 forceful	 seizure	 of	
property	 from	 large	 landholders	 and	 its	 redistribution	 to	 tenants	 and	 laborers”	 (Ramsay	
1982,	 p.	 184).	 In	 the	 following	decades,	 the	 growth	of	 the	 Thai	 economy	 via	 conservative	
means	has	been	prioritized	over	policies	 targeting	 inequality.	 The	Ministry	of	 Finance,	 the	
Bank	 of	 Thailand,	 the	 Bureau	 of	 the	 Budget,	 and	 the	 National	 Economic	 and	 Social	
Development	 Board	 largely	 followed	 conservative	 economic	 models.	 “Technocrats	 have	





to	give	 land	 to	 family	members	 (Kuhonta	2011).	 Land	 reform	seems	 to	have	been	of	 little	
political	benefit	to	governing	elites	in	Thailand	(White	2012).			
	
In	 the	 case	of	 South	Korea,	President	Rhee	appeared	 to	use	 land	 reform	 to	 serve	his	 self-
interest,	protecting	 the	 interests	of	governing	elites	as	much	as	possible	 (Ledesma	1980a).	
Under	President	Rhee,	the	debate	on	the	second	phase	of	land	reform	played	out	between	
the	landowner-dominated	legislature	and	a	reforming	executive	between	1949	and	1951.	It	
was	 not	 to	 President	 Rhee’s	 advantage	 to	 allow	 the	 landowners’	 power	 to	 continue	
unabated,	but	at	the	same	time	he	required	the	support	of	wealthy	landowners	to	maintain	
his	 position	 (Putzel	 1992).	 Ultimately,	 President	 Rhee	 sponsored	 the	 land	 redistribution	
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program	 while	 protecting	 those	 landowners,	 on	 whom	 his	 power	 depended,	 by	 ensuring	
that	they	continued	to	hold	an	 important	place	 in	the	new	ruling	society.	President	Rhee’s	
hesitancy	on	 land	reform	was	clearly	witnessed	on	both	his	 lobbying	against	 the	American	














of	 administering	more	 complicated	 property	 rights	 and,	more	 significantly,	 to	 ensure	 that	
powerful	 landed	elites	continued	to	provide	their	support.	While	 less	empirical	evidence	 is	
available	on	the	Thai	case,	governing	elites	have	retaliated	against	those	advocating	for	land	
reform,	marginalized	 the	 issue	 and	 when	 limited	 land	 redistribution	 programs	 have	 been	
implemented,	they	have	ensured	that	family	members	are	among	the	beneficiaries.	It	can	be	
argued	that	governing	elites	 in	South	Korea	and	Taiwan	were	not	operating	under	“normal	















power	 is	 tentative,	 land	 reform	 is	 a	 useful	 tool.	 The	 KMT	 was	 cognizant	 that	 its	 hold	 on	
power	was	tentative.	The	KMT	had	previously	been	defeated	on	Mainland	China	by	Mao’s	
communist	forces	and	had	to	retreated	to	Taiwan.	The	situation	on	the	island	was	unstable.	
Having	 endured	 and	 ultimately	 lost	 a	 lengthy	 civil	war	with	 the	 Communists	 on	Mainland	
China,	 the	KMT	 leaders	understood	the	power	of	 land	to	build	 legitimacy	of	 the	governing	
class.	 Governor	 Chen	 identified	 that	 throughout	 the	 course	 of	 Chinese	 history,	 when	 the	
population	 grew	 to	 a	 point	 that	 the	 land	 could	 not	 sustain	 it,	 civil	 war	 would	 break	 out.	
During	the	civil	war	between	the	communist	and	KMT-led	nationalist	forces,	Governor	Chen	
felt	that	the	KMT	focused	on	its	military	campaign	without	giving	enough	thought	to	the	land	
issue,	 while	 the	 communists	 skillfully	 presented	 themselves	 as	 land	 reformers.	 In	 Mao’s	
words:	“Whoever	wins	the	support	of	the	peasants	will	win	China;	whoever	solves	the	land	
question	will	win	the	peasants”	(Mao	in	Yenan,	1936	in	Ledesma	1980a,	p.	329).	This	allowed	
the	communist’s	 rural	base	of	 support	 to	expand	 immensely,	enabling	 them	 to	defeat	 the	
KMT.	 The	 failure	 of	 the	 KMT	 to	 settle	 the	 land	 issue	was	 equally	 important	 as	 any	 other	




of	 the	main	reasons	why	the	Chinese	Mainland	 fell	 into	communist	hands.	Governor	Chen	
witnessed	 the	 Communists’	 use	 of	 land	 reform,	 alongside	 other	 social	 and	 economic	




The	 KMT’s	 decision	 to	 implement	 land	 reform	 was	 underpinned	 by	 the	 need	 to	 build	
legitimacy	 and	 undermine	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 communists	 across	 the	 Taiwan	 straits.	
Governor	Chen	worked	tirelessly	to	ensure	that	land	reform	was	implemented	successfully.	
He	 energetically	 lobbied	members	 of	 the	 Provincial	 Assembly,	 pushed	 ahead	without	 the	









The	 politically	 unstable	 situation	 in	 which	 the	 KMT	 found	 itself	 in	 and	 its	 decisive	 action	






The	case	of	South	Korea	provides	 further	evidence	 in	support	of	 the	assumption	 that	 land	











Korean	Peninsula,	 it	 is	 therefore	unsurprising	 that	external	 actors	played	a	 key	 role	 in	 the	
redistribution	 of	 land	 in	 the	 south.	 The	 United	 States	 provided	 political	 and	 economic	
support	 to	 the	 south	 and	 was	 strongly	 in	 favor	 of	 land	 reform.	 The	 American	 Military	




Leaving	 the	 international	 dimension	 aside,	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 communist	 forces	 in	 the	
north	 to	 governing	 elites	 in	 the	 south	 saw	 land	 redistribution	 written	 into	 the	 new	
constitution	and	supported	across	the	political	spectrum	once	the	state	of	South	Korea	was	
officially	 created.	 All	 political	 parties	 pledged	 to	 implement	 land	 reform	 during	 the	 first	
election	of	1948,	a	policy	platform	previously	unheard	of	(Hong	2001	in	You	2014).	President	
Rhee	grudgingly	supported	land	reform	as	a	means	to	consolidate	his	power	(Putzel	1992).	
Recognizing	 the	 value	of	 land	 reform,	President	Rhee,	 an	ardent	anti-communist,	 selected	
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former	 communist	 Cho	 Bong-am	 as	 Minister	 of	 Agriculture	 to	 draft	 liberal	 land	 reform	
legislation.	While	Korean	Democratic	Party	members	attempted	 to	 increase	 compensation	
for	 landlords	 to	 300	 percent	 of	 annual	 produce,	 the	 National	 Assembly	 passed	 the	 Land	
Reform	Bill	 and	President	Rhee	 signed	 it	 into	 law	 in	 1950	with	 total	 compensation	 at	 150	
percent	 (Kim	 2001	 in	 You	 2014).	 The	 threat	 posed	 by	 the	 communists	 in	 the	 north	 was	
perceived	to	be	greater	than	the	need	to	placate	landed	elites.	
	








a	 willing	 compromise.	 Landlords	 sold	 a	 total	 of	 500,000	 hectares	 to	 tenants	 in	 1948	 and	
1949,	while	 the	 government	 redistributed	 330,000	 hectares	 after	 the	 Land	 Reform	Act	 of	
1950.	Landlords	were	largely	trying	to	speed	up	what	was	an	inevitable	shift	(Hong	2001	in	
You	2014).	Overall,	land	reform	proved	to	be	a	remarkably	popular	policy	tool	in	the	case	of	
South	 Korea.	 Such	 was	 the	 threat	 to	 South	 Korea’s	 western	 allies,	 governing	 elites	 and	
landed	elites,	all	 three	groups	worked	 together	 to	 implement	wide-ranging	 land	 reform	to	
reinforce	their	vulnerable	position.			
	
The	 case	 of	 Thailand	 also	 offers	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 assumption	 that	 if	 governing	
elites’	 hold	 on	 power	 is	 tentative,	 land	 reform	 can	 become	 a	 useful	 tool.	 The	 Sanya	
Government,	 under	 significant	 political	 pressure	 from	 farmers	 and	 students,	 legislated	 for	
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land	 reform	 via	 the	 1975	 Land	 Reform	 Act.	 Students	mobilized	 poorer	 farmers	 to	 call	 for	
improved	conditions.	They	played	a	critical	role	in	organizing	farmers	across	the	country	and	
ensuring	 their	 participation	 en	 masse	 at	 demonstrations	 (Ramsay	 1982).	 While	 Thai	
governing	elites	appear	to	have	been	aware	of	the	threat	posed	by	farmers,	they	calculated	
that	 it	 was	 not	 so	 large	 as	 to	 require	 them	 to	 challenge	 existing	 power	 structures	 in	 the	
countryside.	They	instead	chose	to	allow	landed	elites	to	repress	students	and	farmers	who	
had	 demanded	 land	 reform.	 The	 student	movement	 was	 undermined	 by	 internal	 conflict	
and	 repression	 and	 increasingly	 became	 less	 helpful	 to	 the	 cause	of	 land	 reform.	 Farmers	
were,	however,	victims	of	the	most	brutal	retaliation	from	landed	elites.	Over	the	course	of	
a	 few	months	 in	1975,	22	activist	 farmers	were	assassinated.	The	uninterested	Thai	police	
did	not	 identify	 the	perpetrators	of	 these	murders	 (Ramsay	1982).	The	Sanya	Government	
ultimately	passed	land	reform	legislation,	but	the	efforts	of	elites	to	repress	those	calling	for	
land	 reform	 saw	 political	 pressure	 diminish	 and	 the	 legislation	 remain	 unimplemented.	





instability,	 but	 have	 never	 implemented	 it.	 The	 Hukbalahap	 guerilla	 movement	 was	 the	
largest	threat	facing	the	Philippines	following	the	Second	World	War	(Tai	1974).	This	was	a	
view	 shared	 by	 governing	 elites	 domestically	 and	 by	 the	 United	 States.	 The	 Hukbalahap	
guerilla	movement	had	mounted	the	resistance	against	the	Japanese	during	the	war,	unlike	
the	 landed	 elites	 who	 were	 enablers	 of	 Japanese	 rule.	 They	 had	 redistributed	 land	 to	
peasants	 during	 the	 war,	 but	 it	 was	 swiftly	 returned	 to	 wealthy	 landowners	 following	
Japanese	 surrender	 (Putzel	 1992).	 The	Hukbalahap	 guerilla	movement	was	 able	 to	 exploit	





Like	 South	 Korea,	 the	 Philippine	 archipelago	 was	 of	 strategic	 importance	 to	 the	 United	
States.	 In	 a	 confidential	 report	 authored	 by	 the	 National	 Security	 Council	 in	 1949,	 the	
Philippines,	 Japan	 and	 the	 Ryukyus	 Islands	 were	 considered	 as	 the	 “first	 line	 of	 defense	
and…[the]	 first	 line	of	offense	 from	which	we	may	 seek	 to	 reduce	 the	area	of	Communist	
control”	 (quoted	 in	 Putzel	 1992,	 p.	 84).	 A	 second	 United	 States	 National	 Security	 Council	
report	 issued	 in	 1950	 stated,	 “The	 security	 interests	 of	 the	United	 States	 require	 that	 the	
Philippines	 become	 and	 remain	 stable,	 anti-communist,	 and	 pro-American”	 (quoted	 in	
Putzel	 1992,	 p.84).	 In	 reality,	 the	 Hukbalahap	 guerilla	movement	was	 a	 peasant	 rebellion	
fueled	by	domestic	unrest	and	not	part	of	 the	 international	 communist	movement	 (Putzel	
1992).	In	the	Cold	War	environment,	this	was	not	to	say	that	United	States	did	not	deem	the	





the	 Philippines	 in	 1950,	 Bell	 suggested	 that	 extensive	 land	 redistribution	 was	 the	 only	
answer	 to	 rural	 discontent.	 The	 following	 year,	 the	United	 States	Mutual	 Security	 Agency	
appointed	 Robert	 Hardie	 to	 report	 on	 the	 tenancy	 situation	 in	 the	 Philippines.	 Like	 Bell,	
Hardie	also	recommended	comprehensive	land	reform:	
In	 championing	 the	 cause	 of	 tenants,	 communism	 wins	 their	 sympathies	 –	 just	 as	
governments,	careless	of	causes	–	whose	actions	are	limited	to	the	suppression	of	symptoms	
and	 maintenance	 of	 the	 status	 quo	 –	 are	 bound	 to	 win	 their	 enmity…Because	 of	 these	
defects,	the	land	tenure	system	stands	as	an	obstacle,	wasting	all	efforts	of	the	United	States	
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to	 foster	 the	development	of	 a	 stable	democratic	 economy”	 (Hardie	Report,	 p.	 7	 in	Putzel	
1992).		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 United	 States	 sent	 Colonel	 Edward	 Lansdale	 to	 lead	 a	







never	 faced	a	 threat	of	 the	 same	magnitude	as	 those	endangering	 stability	 in	 Taiwan	and	
South	Korea	and	that	is	why	land	reform	was	not	implemented	there.	It	is	beyond	the	scope	
of	this	thesis	to	determine	which	of	the	cases	under	study	faced	the	largest	threat	and	it	is	
difficult	 to	 analyze	 what	 would	 have	 happened	 in	 the	 Philippines	 if	 Lansdale’s	
counterinsurgency	program	not	been	as	effective.	While	the	Hukbalahap	guerilla	movement	
appears	to	have	been	the	greatest	threat	to	the	stability	of	the	Philippine	State	during	the	








created	 a	 convincing	 narrative	 around	 the	 need	 for	 land	 reform,	 but	 in	 reality	 his	 reform	
program	 made	 little	 difference	 to	 peasants.	 Aside	 from	 using	 land	 reform	 to	 build	 their	
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Like	 the	 Philippine	 leaders	 who	 had	 gone	 before	 her,	 both	 democratic	 and	 authoritarian,	
President	 Aquino	 used	 the	 promise	 of	 land	 reform	 to	 establish	 new	 links	 with	 the	 rural	
masses	to	strengthen	her	influence	and	suppress	the	threat	of	communist	insurgency	to	her	
rule.	Land	reform	remained	a	promise;	it	was	never	effectively	implemented.	The	case	study	
of	 the	 Philippines	 supports	 the	 assumption	 that	 if	 governing	 elites’	 hold	 on	 power	 is	
tentative	 then	 land	 reform	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 tool.	 Governing	 elites	 in	 the	 Philippines	 were	




The	 evidence	 presented	 across	 the	 four	 cases	 supports	 the	 assumption	 that	 if	 governing	
elites’	 hold	 on	 power	 is	 tentative	 land	 reform	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 tool.	 As	 expected,	 there	 is	
strong	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 this	 assumption	 in	 the	 cases	 of	 Taiwan	 and	 South	 Korea.	
Governing	 elites	 in	 both	 cases	 were	 in	 highly	 vulnerable	 positions;	 they	 decided	 to	
implement	 land	 reform	 to	 build	 legitimacy,	 reinforcing	 their	 hold	 on	power.	 The	 evidence	
from	the	Thai	case	also	offers	support	for	the	assumption.	Governing	elites’	hold	on	power	
in	Thailand	was	tentative	at	times	and	land	reform	was	considered	a	viable	policy	to	address	
this.	 Ultimately,	 governing	 elites	 in	 the	 kingdom	 calculated	 that	 their	 position	was	 secure	
enough	 and	 that	 land	 reform	 was	 not	 in	 their	 self-interest.	 Governing	 elites	 in	 the	
Philippines	made	a	similar	decision.	The	position	of	governing	elites	in	the	Philippines	came	
under	 greater	 threat	 than	 the	 position	 of	 those	 in	 Thailand.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 although	 the	
position	 of	 governing	 elites	 in	 the	 Philippines	 was	 more	 vulnerable	 than	 in	 Thailand,	 the	
threat	to	governing	elites	in	the	former	was	still	not	large	enough	to	tip	the	scales	in	favor	of	
land	reform.	On	the	other	hand,	there	 is	a	question	around	whether	governing	elites	were	
able	 to	 perceive	 threat	 to	 the	 same	 extent	 as	 others	 given	 the	 centrality	 of	 land	 to	 elite	





The	 relationship	 between	 regime	 type	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 land	 reform	 does	 not	







it	has	experienced	various	 regime	types.	This	makes	 it	a	good	case	 to	 test	 the	assumption	
that	regime	type	is	unlikely	to	determine	the	extent	of	land	reform.	Focusing	on	the	period	
following	 the	Second	World	War,	 the	Philippines	has	been	 led	by	elected	and	non-elected	
governments. 10 	Neither	 elected	 nor	 authoritarian	 regimes	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	
implementation	 of	 land	 reform.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 authoritarian	 rulers	 are	 more	
insulated	 from	 society	 and	 therefore	 able	 to	 implement	 ambitious	 projects	 that	 have	 the	
potential	to	undermine	powerful	vested	interests.	In	the	case	of	the	Philippines,	“the	Marcos	
years	 proved	 that	 an	 authoritarian	 form	 of	 government	 has	 no	 special	 proclivity	 toward	
reform	 implementation”	 (Putzel	 1992,	 p.	 374).	 Under	Marcos	 the	 Philippine	 state	 did	 not	
become	 more	 autonomous	 from	 society.	 In	 the	 Philippines	 ‘personal-clientist’	 linkages	
govern	 how	 resources	 are	 distributed	 (Manasca	 and	 Tan	 2012),	 or	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	
thesis,	 how	 land	 is	 distributed	 and	utilized.	 “The	effect	 of	 the	 authoritarian	period	on	 the	





If	 these	powerful	members	of	Philippine	 society	decide	 that	 land	 reform	will	work	against	
their	 interests	 they	will	 ensure	 that	 the	 status	 quo	 is	 upheld,	 as	 has	 been	 the	 case	 since	
																																																								
10	While	 elections	occurred,	 Philippine	 governance	 in	 the	period	 following	 the	 Second	World	War	up	until	 the	
declaration	of	Martial	Law	under	President	Marcos	in	1972	is	most	appropriately	termed	“constitutional”	rather	
than	 “democratic”	 (see	 Wurfel	 in	 Riedinger	 1995).	 Riedinger	 elaborates,	 “This	 terminology	 emphasizes	 the	
preoccupation	 of	 the	 Philippines	 political	 elite	 with	 legal	 processes	 rather	 than	 widespread	 power	 sharing.	
Reflecting	 their	common	origin,	 there	was	 little	of	substance,	composition,	or	constituencies	 to	distinguish	 the	
two	 leading	 parties,	 the	 Nacionlista	 Party	 and	 the	 Liberal	 Party.	 Each	 party	 was	 built	 upon	 vertically	 linked	
patron-client	networks.	Party	switching	was	frequent	as	national,	provincial	and	local	leaders	sought	advantage	










explain	 why	 land	 reform	 occurred	 in	 some	 cases,	 but	 not	 others.	 The	 American	 Military	
Government	 implemented	 the	 first	wave	of	 land	 reform.	President	Rhee	 implemented	 the	
second	 wave	 of	 land	 reform.	 The	 American	 Military	 Government	 was	 an	 unelected	
occupying	force,	while	President	Rhee	and	his	executive	were	elected,	albeit	indirectly.11	The	
considerable	threat	posed	by	communist	forces	in	the	north	led	both	the	American	Military	
Government	 and	 President	 Rhee’s	 administration	 to	 implement	 land	 reform;	 building	
legitimacy	for	a	capitalist,	West	facing	South	Korea.	The	transition	from	military	government	
imposed	by	an	outside	occupier,	 to	 an	elected	 system	of	government,	did	not	 change	 the	
political	calculation	around	the	need	to	redistribute	land.		
	
The	evidence	presented	on	 the	Philippines	and	South	Korea	 supports	 the	assumption	 that	
regime	 type	 is	 unlikely	 to	 determine	 the	 extent	 of	 land	 reform.	 The	 Philippine	 example	
demonstrates	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 between	 governing	 elites	 and	 landed	 elites	 is	
more	 likely	 to	determine	 the	extent	of	 land	 reform	 than	 the	 type	of	 regime.	While	 in	 the	






The	 final	 assumption	 of	 the	 theory	 is	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 governing	 elites	 have	
from	 landed	 elites	 is	 likely	 to	 determine	 the	 extent	 of	 land	 reform.	 It	 is	 expected	 that	
																																																								
11	President	 Rhee	 was	 elected	 by	 member	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Assembly	 in	 July	 1948	 and	 charged	 with	






been	 captured	 by	 landed	 elites	 resulting	 in	 the	 failure	 of	 governing	 elites	 to	 redistribute	
land.	 Governing	 elites	 have	 no	 autonomy	 from	 landed	 elites.	 Landed	 elites	 buy	 political	
influence	to	stop	land	reform	programs,	in	many	instances,	families	that	own	large	swathes	













Bill	 the	 Philippine	 National	 Rice	 Producers	 Association	 (NRPA)	 aggressively	 opposed	 the	
legislation	on	behalf	of	landed	elites:	 	









or	 intercepted	 them	as	 they	 entered	 the	 session	 hall,	 to	 confer	 on	 the	 bill’s	 status	 and	 to	
influence,	if	possible,	the	action	on	the	bill	(Starner	1961,	p.	164-165).			
	
With	 such	 aggressive	 lobbying	 techniques,	 it	 is	 unsurprising	 that	 the	 potency	 of	 the	 1955	
Land	 Reform	 Bill	 was	 diluted.	While	 other	 groups	 representing	 landed	 interests	were	 less	
forceful	in	their	methods,	they	did	have	lobbyists	in	the	Philippine	Congress	(Starner	1961).	
Had	President	Magsaysay	not	pushed	the	Philippine	Congress	to	pass	the	bill	as	a	matter	of	
urgency,	 it	would	have	 likely	 fallen	over	altogether.	Many	 in	the	Philippine	Congress	had	a	
hard	decision	to	make.	Congressmen	had	the	choice	to	either	accept	a	land	reform	program	
that	their	patrons	vehemently	opposed,	or	stop	the	legislation	and	upset	a	highly	regarded	
President.	 Ultimately,	 many	 Congressmen	 chose	 to	 support	 the	 legislation.	 Despite	 the	
influence	 and	 importance	 of	 landed	 interests,	 electorally	 their	 position	 was	 vulnerable	 if	
they	turned	against	Magsaysay	(Tai	1974).	 Importantly,	they	were	also	well	aware	that	the	
signing	 of	 the	 Land	Reform	Act	was	merely	 one	 step	 and	 that	 the	 implementation	 of	 this	
legislation	would	provide	many	additional	opportunities	for	landed	elites	to	intervene.						
	
Beyond	 networks	 of	 patronage	 and	 powerful	 lobby	 groups,	 landed	 elites	 have	 directly	
infiltrated	the	Philippine	state	to	pursue	their	self-interest	(You	2014).	Apart	from	the	period	
of	 authoritarian	 rule	 under	 President	 Marcos	 and	 President	 Duterte’s	 recent	 election,	
traditional	 landed	 families	 have	 dominated	 politics.	 For	 example,	 following	 the	 People	
Power	 Revolution,	 close	 to	 85	 percent	 of	 representatives	 elected	 to	 Congress	 in	 1987	
belonged	to	 ‘traditional	clans’	 (Mojares	1993	 in	You	2014).	The	Philippine	bureaucracy	too	
has	 been	 captured	 by	 landed	 interests.	 It	 is	 patrimonial	 and	 oligarchic	 as	 opposed	 to	
autonomous	 and	meritocratic	 (Hutchcroft	 1998	 in	 You	 2014).	While	 in	 theory	 entrance	 to	





The	politics	of	 land	reform	can	be	characterized	as	a	story	of	continuation	 throughout	 the	
second	 half	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 not	 one	 of	 change.	 The	 Philippine	 military,	 like	 the	
bureaucracy,	 is	part	of	the	prevailing	class	alignment	in	the	country	(Putzel	1992).	Patterns	








the	 heart	 of	 the	 ‘New	 Society’,	 in	 reality	 nothing	 changed	 for	 tenants	 and	 agricultural	
laborers.	A	small	number	of	powerful	traditional	landed	elites	lost	their	land	under	President	
Marcos,	but	 landed	 interests	were	 still	well	 represented	 in	his	 inner	 circle.	 Even	President	
Marcos	 himself	 became	 an	 important	 landowner.	 Because	 the	 Philippine	 State	 has	 been	
captured	 by	 landed	 interests	 since	 colonial	 times,	 President	 Marcos	 found	 it	 easier	 to	
preserve	his	power	by	aligning	himself	with	 landed	elites	as	opposed	to	 implementing	real	
land	 reform	 that	 would	 undermine	 their	 interests	 (You	 2014,	 p.	 210).	 In	 summary:	 “The	
socio-economic	consequences	of	agrarian	reform	in	the	Philippines	have	been	ambivalent	at	





Following	 the	 People	 Power	 Revolution	 that	 ousted	 President	 Marcos,	 President	 Aquino	
pledged	to	carry	out	land	reform	but	focused	on	restoring	democracy	and	shaping	the	new	
Philippine	constitution.	President	Aquino	also	 restored	 the	political	 influence	of	 traditional	
Philippine	political	and	economic	elites.	As	they	had	been	in	the	past,	democratic	institutions	





ranging	 land	 reform	 be	 implemented,	 but	 she	 deferred	 to	 the	 Philippine	 Congress,	 which	
lowered	the	ambition	of	the	land	reform	program:				
At	each	stage	in	the	deliberations	over	the	reform,	the	scope	of	the	proposed	program	was	
successfully	 reduced.	 Perhaps	 the	 greatest	 triumph	 of	 the	 anti-reform	 forces	 was	 getting	
Aquino	 to	defer	 to	 the	 legislature,	 landed	 interests	were	particularly	effective	 in	exercising	
direct	 and	 indirect	 influence	 to	 weaken	 the	 reform	 program	 and	 tailor	 exemptions	 and	
exceptions	to	the	program.	The	result	is	program	limited	in	scope,	to	be	implemented	over	a	




her	 presidential	 campaign,	 “I	 shall	 ask	 no	 greater	 sacrifices	 than	 I	myself	 am	 prepared	 to	
make”	 (quoted	 in	 Riedinger	 1995,	 p.	 139).	 The	 reform	 law	 contained	 a	 provision	 on	
corporate	 stock	 distributions,	 which	 were	 an	 alternative	 to	 redistributing	 land	 to	 the	
farmworkers	 that	 cultivated	 it.	 The	 corporate	 stock	 distributions	 would	 see	 farmworkers	
receive	one-third	minority	stock	shares	at	no	cost.	“Analysis	suggests	that	the	workers	would	
be	no	worse	off,	indeed	might	be	substantially	better	off,	if	they	were	to	purchase	the	land	
assets	 of	 Hacienda	 Luisita	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 reform	 law	 rather	 than	 accept	 the	
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proposed	 ‘no	 cost’	 stock	 distribution”	 (Riedinger	 1989	 in	 Riedinger	 1995,	 p.	 180).	 When	







of	 including	 all	 agricultural	 and	 horticultural	 sectors	 in	 the	 reform	 program’s	 scope.	 The	
Minister	of	Agrarian	Reform,	Heherson	T	Alvarez,	 suggested	 that	 the	 land	reform	program	
be	expanded	to	include	sugar	and	coconut	sectors,	however,	Ramon	Mitra,	the	Minister	of	
Agriculture	at	the	time	and	owner	of	large	cattle	and	sugar	holdings,	strongly	opposed	this.	
Minister	 Mitra	 asserted	 that	 the	 average	 sugarcane	 and	 coconut	 farms	 were	 small	 and	




As	expected,	peasants	have	not	had	a	meaningful	 influence	on	 the	 land	 reform	process	 in	
the	Philippines:					
As	the	reformist	and	anti-reformist	forces	squared	off,	the	Philippine	masses	remained,	to	a	





politics	 and	 set	 the	 reform	 agenda,	 but	 this	 did	 not	 happen.	 During	 Aquino’s	 presidential	
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campaign,	 it	 is	 likely	that	many	peasants	were	simply	unaware	of	her	pledge	to	implement	
land	 reform.	 President	Marcos	 had	 tightly	 controlled	 the	media,	which	meant	 that	 during	
Aquino’s	 presidential	 campaign	 and	 beyond,	 villagers	 had	 limited	 access	 to	 information	
(Mydans	1986a	 in	Riedinger	1995).	According	 to	estimates,	 up	 to	90	percent	of	 Philippine	
peasants	were	 not	 organized	 (Montemayor	 1987	 in	 Riedinger	 1995).	 Peasants	were	more	
likely	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	 their	 patron’s	 behavior	 and	 views,	 than	 they	were	 by	 Aquino’s	
reform	pledges,	when	they	voted	in	the	1986	presidential	election	(Riedinger	1995).			
	
Not	only	were	peasants	unlikely	 to	be	organized	politically	or	have	access	 to	 independent	
sources	 of	 media	 commentary,	 their	 ability	 to	 advocate	 for	 themselves	 forcefully	 was	
curtained	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 private	 armies,	 owned	 by	 landed	 elites.	 Private	 armies	 and	
Civilian	Home	Defense	Forces,	which	were	established	during	martial	 law,	were	considered	
to	be	the	worst	abusers	of	human	rights.	President	Marcos	supporters	Eduardo	Cojuangco	
(Aquino’s	 cousin)	 and	Armando	Gustillo	 kept	 vast	 private	 armies	of	 1,600	 and	1,200	men,	




from	 the	 land.	 Numerous	 attempts	 have	 been	made	 to	 implement	 land	 reform	 and	 each	
time	 these	have	 failed.	While	elite	power	has	often	been	 tentative	 in	 the	archipelago,	 the	
balance	of	forces	within	society	has	been	significantly	weighted	in	favor	of	landed	interests,	
which	 has	 resulted	 in	meaningful	 land	 reform	being	 thwarted	 over	 the	 decades.	 Peasants	
have	 no	 effective	means	 to	 participate	 in	 politics.	 Parties	 emerge	 around	 leaders	 prior	 to	
elections	 and	 strong	 patronage	 networks	 mobilize	 voters,	 not	 infrequently	 via	 coercive	
means.	The	corrupt	nature	of	Philippine	party	politics	sees	peasants	silenced,	unable	provide	
an	 effective	 counter	 balance	 to	 the	 power	 of	 landed	 elites.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	
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relationship	 between	 governing	 elites	 and	 landed	 elites	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 determine	 the	












In	 the	 case	 of	 Thailand,	 the	 state	 has	 been	 partially	 captured	 by	 landed	 elites.	 Governing	
elites	have	a	limited	autonomy	from	this	important	sector	of	society.	The	“Thai	state	is	more	
embedded	 than	 autonomous,	 but	 has	 a	 strong	 centralist	 ideology	 as	well	 as	 considerable	
popular	 prestige	 on	 traditional	 grounds”	 (White	 2012,	 p.	 577).	 While	 landed	 families	 in	
Thailand	do	not	have	 the	 same	status	and	power	of	 those	 in	 the	Philippines,	 they	are	 still	
influential.	 The	 Thai	 Land	 Reform	 Act	 in	 1975	 demonstrates	 this.	 The	 Sanya	 Government	
established	 Farmers’	 Assistance	Committees	 to	 help	 farmers	 get	 their	 land	back	 that	 they	
had	 lost,	 but	 student	 representatives	 on	 these	 committees	 argued	 that	 other	
representatives	were	heavily	predisposed	to	the	wishes	of	the	landed	elite.	The	Government	
representatives	 on	 the	 Farmers’	 Assistance	 Committees	 enjoyed	 hospitality	 provided	 by	
landed	elites	when	 they	visited	a	 region	 to	 consider	peasant	grievances.	 The	 landed	elites	
used	 their	 influence	 to	 stop	 tenants	 and	 laborers	 from	 taking	 their	 grievances	 to	 the	
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power	of	 landed	elites	 in	the	countryside.	The	use	of	coercion	by	the	nak	 leng	“network	 is	
not	likely	to	be	challenged	lightly,	either	by	democratically	elected	governments	who	use	it	
to	help	deliver	votes,	or	by	military	governments	who	rely	on	 it	 to	help	maintain	stability”	






In	 the	 case	of	 South	Korea,	 the	American	Military	Government	was	 insulated	 from	 landed	
elites.	 It	 implemented	 the	 first	wave	of	 land	 reform	 to	ensure	 that	 the	communists	 in	 the	
north	of	the	peninsula	did	not	 infiltrate	the	south	and	had	 little	regard	for	the	 interests	of	
landed	elites,	who	had	colluded	with	their	Japanese	occupiers.	President	Rhee’s	government	





tried	 to	 appeal	 to	 peasants	 by	 advocating	 for	 such	 a	 policy	 (You	 2014).	When	 governing	
elites’	hold	on	power	is	tentative,	they	have	a	more	autonomy	to	pursue	policies	that	would,	
under	 normal	 circumstances,	 be	 unpopular	 with	 landed	 elites.	 The	 latter	 recognize	 that	
compromise	 is	required	to	avoid	the	alternative:	the	collapse	of	the	regime	altogether	and	
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largely	 grateful	 for	 the	 opportunity	 to	 receive	 at	 least	 some	 compensation	 for	 their	 land.	
Landed	 elites	 sold	 a	 total	 of	 500,000	 hectares	 to	 tenants	 in	 1948	 and	 1949,	 while	 the	
government	redistributed	330,000	hectares	after	the	Land	Reform	Act	 in	1950.	The	degree	
of	threat	facing	the	regime,	and	landed	elites,	gave	President	Rhee	the	autonomy	required	
to	 implement	 land	reform.	The	theory	on	the	politics	of	 land	reform	developed	 in	Chapter	





Second	World	War.	 Having	 fled	Mainland	 China,	 the	 KMT	were	 newcomers	 to	 the	 island.	





the	 Provincial	 Council	 (executive	 branch	 of	 the	 Provisional	 Government),	 with	 limited	
involvement	 of	 the	 national	 and	 provincial	 legislatures.	 “Of	 all	 of	 these	 organs,	 only	 the	
Provincial	Assembly	had	some	representation	from	landed	interests.	But	the	Assembly	was	






The	 evidence	 presented	 supports	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 governing	







status	 and	 power	 of	 their	 Philippine	 cousins,	 but	 they	 are	 still	 a	 powerful	 group	 within	
society.	 Governing	 elites	 have	 relied	 upon	 them	 to	 uphold	 their	 rule	 and	 calculated	 that	
implementing	land	reform	in	the	kingdom	would	not	be	in	their	self-interest.	In	the	case	of	
South	 Korea,	 the	 position	 of	 both	 governing	 elites	 and	 landed	 elites	 was	 under	 threat.	 A	
consensus	emerged	among	governing	and	landed	elites	to	redistribute	land.	While	society	in	
South	 Korea	was	 structured	 in	 a	 similar	way	 to	 Thailand	 and	 the	 Philippines,	with	 landed	
elites	wielding	significant	influence	over	governing	elites,	the	threat	posed	by	the	communist	
north	during	Rhee’s	presidency	gave	him	the	required	autonomy	to	implement	land	reform.	
Unlike	 the	 cases	 of	 the	 Philippines,	 Thailand	 and	 South	 Korea,	 Taiwan	 and	 the	 American	
Military	 Government	 in	 Korea	 were	 insulated	 from	 landed	 elites,	 which	 meant	 that	 they	


















of	 land	 reform.	 It	 concluded	 that	while	 a	number	of	 attempts	have	been	made	 to	explain	
variation	 in	 land	 reform	 implementation,	 some	 contributions	 are	 stronger	 than	 others.	
Hung-chao	Tai	(1974)	provided	the	most	convincing	answer	to	the	research	question,	which	
focused	on	the	relationship	between	legitimacy	building	and	class	coalitions.	Chapter	Three	







land	 reform	 is	 unlikely	 to	be	 in	 the	 self-interest	of	 governing	elites;	 secondly,	 if	 governing	
elites’	hold	on	power	is	tentative,	land	reform	may	be	a	useful	tool;	thirdly,	that	regime	type	
is	unlikely	to	determine	the	extent	of	land	reform;	and	lastly,	that	the	degree	of	autonomy	
governing	 elites	 have	 from	 landed	 elites	 is	 likely	 to	 determine	 the	 extent	 of	 land	 reform.	
Overall,	 it	was	 expected	 that	 land	 reform	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 implemented	 unless	 governing	
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unequal	distribution	of	 land	has	 served	generations	of	 governing	elites.	 It	 has	been	 in	 the	
self-interest	of	governing	elites	in	the	Philippines	to	grant	monopoly	rights	to	land,	both	to	
reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 administering	 more	 complicated	 property	 rights	 regimes	 and,	
significantly,	to	ensure	that	powerful	landed	elites	continue	to	support	successive	Philippine	
governments.	In	Thailand,	land	reform	was	legislated	for	in	1975	when	Prime	Minister	Sanya	
came	 under	 pressure	 from	 students	 and	 farmers	 to	 implement	 agrarian	 reform.	 It	 was	
drafted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 allow	 for	 numerous	 loopholes,	 upholding	 the	 system	 of	
patronage	 that	 had	 been	 advantageous	 for	 governing	 elites	 in	 Thailand.	 In	 South	 Korea,	
President	Rhee’s	hold	on	power	was	tentative,	which	made	land	reform	an	almost	necessary	
step	 to	 take.	 Sponsoring	 the	 land	 redistribution	program	aligned	with	his	 self-interest	 and	
that	of	 landed	elites,	whose	position	 in	society	depended	upon	the	continuity	of	President	




The	 empirical	 evidence	 across	 the	 four	 cases	 supports	 the	 second	 assumption,	 that	 if	 the	
power	 of	 governing	 elites	 is	 unstable,	 land	 reform	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 tool.	 The	 relationship	
between	regime	threat	and	reform	was	relatively	well	documented	in	the	existing	literature	
on	land	reform.	A	number	of	theorists	state	that	threat	provides	an	adequate	explanation	of	
variance	 in	 land	reform,	but	this	thesis	argues	that	 it	only	provides	a	partial	explanation.	 If	
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governing	 elites’	 hold	 on	 power	 is	 tentative,	 then	 land	 reform	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 tool,	 but	
ultimately	it	will	only	be	implemented	if	governing	elites	are	autonomous	from	landed	elites.		
	
In	the	case	of	Taiwan,	 the	KMT	was	cognizant	that	 its	hold	on	power	was	tentative.	 It	had	
already	lost	Mainland	China	to	Mao’s	communist	forces	and	saw	land	reform	as	a	means	to	
build	legitimacy	for	its	rule.	It	also	saw	land	reform	as	a	tool	to	undermine	the	influence	of	
communist	 forces	 seeking	 to	 infiltrate	 villages	 from	across	 the	 Taiwan	 Straits.	 The	 case	of	
South	Korea	provides	the	strongest	evidence	in	support	of	this	assumption.	Unlike	in	Taiwan,	
President	 Rhee	 and	 other	 governing	 elites	were	 reliant	 on	 landed	 elites	 to	maintain	 their	
hold	on	power,	however,	the	threat	posed	by	communist	forces	in	the	north	was	such	that	
governing	elites	were	able	 to	write	 land	redistribution	 into	the	new	constitution.	This	step	
received	 support	 from	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum	 and	 even	 landed	 elites	 themselves	
assisted	 with	 its	 implementation,	 such	 was	 their	 fear	 that	 they	 would	 otherwise	 lose	
everything.	 The	 case	 of	 Thailand,	 unlike	 the	 preceding	 two,	 demonstrates	 what	 happens	
when	 governing	 elites	 consider	 their	 hold	 on	 power	 to	 be	more	 secure.	Under	 significant	
pressure	from	farmers	and	students,	governing	elites	in	Thailand	legislated	for	land	reform.	
Nevertheless,	 they	 later	 calculated	 that	 the	 threat	 posed	was	 limited	 and	 decided	 against	
implementation	 to	 avoid	 upsetting	 power	 structures	 in	 the	 countryside	 that	 served	 their	
interests.		
	
The	 Philippines	 has	 only	 witnessed	 very	 limited	 land	 redistribution,	 but	 unlike	 Thailand,	
governing	elites	hold	on	power	was	often	 tentative.	 In	 the	1950s,	 the	Hukbalahap	guerilla	
movement,	 which	 exploited	 the	 land	 issue,	 was	 deemed	 a	 threat	 to	 governing	 elites	 and	
American	 geo-strategic	 interests.	 The	 Magsaysay	 Administration	 and	 the	 United	 States	
Government	 seriously	 considered	 implementing	 wide-ranging	 land	 reform,	 but	 decided	




implement	 wide-ranging	 land	 reform,	 but	 did	 not	 follow	 through	 on	 this.	 Some	 theorists	
argue	 that	 the	 threat	 faced	by	governing	elites	 in	 the	Philippines	was	not	as	 great	as	 that	
faced	by	Taiwan	or	South	Korea,	but	the	ongoing	issue	of	landlessness	and	poverty	has	the	
potential	 to	 undermine	 the	 Philippine	 state	 and	 those	 who	 control	 it.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	







the	 politics	 of	 land	 reform,	 the	 correlation	 between	 regime	 type	 and	 land	 reform	
implementation	was	analyzed	in	order	to	eliminate	a	counter	theory	that	runs	through	the	
literature.	A	preoccupation	with	binary	 categorization	 can	 lead	 theorists	 to	overlook	more	
nuanced	 variables,	 which	 is	 why	 this	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 power	 structures	 within	 societies,	
rather	 than	 regime	 type.	 The	 Philippines	 has	 experienced	 periods	 of	 constitutional	 rule,	
authoritarianism	and	democracy,	yet	the	story	of	land	reform,	or	lack	there	of,	remains	the	
same	 under	 each.	 President	 Marcos,	 an	 authoritarian	 ruler,	 was	 no	 more	 insulated	 from	
landed	 elites	 than	 elected	 presidents	 who	 went	 before	 and	 after	 him.	 In	 the	 Philippines,	
society	 is	stronger	than	the	state	and	regime	type	has	not	changed	this.	The	case	of	South	
Korea	provides	 further	evidence	 in	 support	of	 this	 assumption.	Both	an	outside	occupying	
force	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 American	 Military	 Government	 and	 President	 Rhee’s	 elected	





is	 likely	 to	determine	the	extent	of	 land	reform,	 is	 found	to	carry	explanatory	weight.	This	
assumption	draws	on	a	truism	of	politics,	that	no	group	of	elites	will	legislate	themselves	out	
of	 power.	 As	 such,	 this	 thesis	 finds	 that	 there	 is	 a	 correlation	 between	 the	 source	 of	
governing	 elites’	 power	 and	 the	 policies	 that	 they	 choose	 to	 implement.	When	 governing	









While	 landed	 elites	 in	 Thailand	 do	 not	 have	 the	 same	 status	 and	 power	 of	 those	 in	 the	













introduced	 wide-ranging	 land	 redistribution,	 did	 not,	 however,	 enjoy	 the	 same	 degree	 of	
autonomy.	When	Rhee	became	President,	 governing	elites	 in	South	Korea	were	 reliant	on	
landed	elites,	however,	the	unstable	political	situation	threatened	the	position	of	both.	Land	
reform	became	a	necessary	tool,	with	a	consensus	emerging	among	governing	and	 landed	
elites	 to	 redistribute	 land.	 The	 threat	posed	by	 the	 communist	north	gave	President	Rhee	





The	 findings	 of	 this	 thesis	 suggest	 that	 tentative	 power	 and	 governing	 autonomy	 can	 be	
interdependent.	 In	 South	 Korea,	 the	 threat	 of	 a	 communist	 revolution	 created	 an	
environment	in	which	the	government’s	hold	on	power	was	tentative	and	the	position	and	
security	 of	 landed	 elites	 was	 uncertain.	 It	 was	 the	 specific	 political	 context	 that	 gave	
President	Rhee	the	autonomy	to	implement	land	reform	that	he	would	not	have	otherwise	
had.	In	contrast	to	South	Korea,	the	case	of	the	Philippines	demonstrates	that	the	capture	of	









which	 governing	 elites’	 hold	 on	 power	 is	 tentative	 is	 always	 a	matter	 of	 degree,	 as	 is	 the	
extent	to	which	governing	elites	are	autonomous	from	landed	elites.	Figure	IV:	Theory	on	the	
Politics	of	Land	Reform	illustrates	the	findings	of	this	thesis:	that	land	reform	is	unlikely	to	be	






While	 the	evidence	available	has	 supported	 the	 theory	on	 the	politics	 of	 land	 reform,	 the	
findings	 of	 this	 thesis	 are	 not	 without	 limitations	 and	 they	 are	 preliminary	 in	 nature.	As	
discussed	 in	Chapter	Three,	 the	evidence	used	 to	 test	 the	hypotheses	 is	obtained	 through	
secondary	source	material.	Given	the	limited	scope	of	this	thesis	and	the	secondary	source	
material	available,	the	hypotheses	could	not	be	tested	as	rigorously	as	desired.	The	analysis	
contained	 in	 Chapter	 Four	 is	 derived	 from	 empirical	 observations	 from	 a	 relatively	 small	
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number	of	secondary	sources.	While	detailed	scholarly	accounts	of	land	reform	programs	in	






scholars’	 empirical	 accounts	 of	 land	 reform	 programs	 could	 have	 been	 cross-checked.	
Frequently	only	one	or	 two	secondary	 sources	have	been	utilized	 to	describe	 specific	 land	
reform	 programs	 across	 the	 four	 cases.	 While	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis,	 a	 wider	
reading	 of	 secondary	 source	material	 in	 related	 areas	 of	 inquiry	 and	 a	 survey	 of	 primary	
source	material	would	help	to	increase	the	reliability	of	the	findings	presented.			
		
A	 second	 issue	arises	due	 to	 the	 lack	of	 secondary	 source	material.	The	dominance	of	 the	
literature	on	the	Philippine	case	may	 led	to	conclusions	biased	to	the	particularities	of	 the	
archipelago’s	 experience	 of	 land	 reform.	 For	 example,	 the	 conclusions	 drawn	 on	 the	 final	
assumption,	that	the	degree	of	autonomy	governing	elites	have	from	landed	elites	is	likely	to	
determine	the	extent	of	land	reform,	are	most	persuasive	in	the	case	of	the	Philippines.	The	





Peninsula,	 President	 Rhee’s	 Government	 did	 not,	 yet	 land	 reform	 still	 occurred.	 A	 closer	
examination	of	the	events	leading	up	to	President	Rhee’s	land	reform	program	using	primary	
source	 material	 is	 perhaps	 required	 to	 either	 reinforce	 or	 challenge	 the	 importance	 of	
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autonomy	 as	 a	 variable.	 Based	 on	 the	 secondary	 source	 information	 available,	 this	 thesis	
was	 not	 able	 to	 fully	 explore	 and	 analyze	 the	 dynamics	 at	 play	 between	 President	 Rhee’s	
Government	 and	 landed	 elites.	 While	 this	 thesis	 finds	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 autonomy	
governing	 elites	 have	 from	 landed	 elites	 is	 likely	 to	 determine	 the	 extent	 of	 land	 reform,	
further	 analysis	 of	 the	 South	 Korea	 case	 has	 the	 ability	 to	 challenge	 this	 finding	 or,	 in	
statistical	methodology	terms,	lead	to	a	Type	One	Error.	If,	however,	further	analysis	were	to	
uphold	the	finding	that	the	degree	of	autonomy	between	governing	elites	and	landed	elites	









interests	 of	 governing	 elites,	 large	 segments	 of	 the	 population	 remain	 unproductive	 and	
poor	 as	 a	 result.	 Land	 reform	 helped	 to	 transform	 Taiwan	 and	 South	 Korea	 from	
impoverished	 countries	 to	 wealthy,	 relatively	 equitable	 ones	 in	 just	 a	 few	 decades.	 The	
motivation	 to	 understand	 why	 land	 reform	 had	 been	 implemented	 in	 Taiwan	 and	 South	
Korea,	but	not	Thailand	and	the	Philippines,	stems	from	the	desire	to	understand	why	elites	
in	the	latter	two	countries	were	not	able	to	prioritize	the	livelihoods	of	their	people,	or	the	
productivity	 of	 their	 arable	 land.	 While	 the	 findings	 that	 this	 thesis	 has	 drawn	 are	
disappointing,	they	are	also	a	reminder	to	ignore	political	rhetoric	in	both	democracies	and	
non-democracies	alike	and	to	look	deeper	at	the	bases	of	support	on	which	governing	elites	
rely	 on.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Philippines,	 President	Magsaysay	 called	 for	 “land	 to	 the	 tiller”	
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while	Presidents	Macapagal	 and	Marcos	 called	 for	 the	 “emancipation	of	 the	peasants”	 (in	
Ledesma	 1980a),	 all	 three	 were	 likely	 insincere.	 It	 is	 only	 when	 citizens	 understand	 the	
nature	of	politics	that	they	will	be	in	a	position	to	demand	that	their	interests	are	accounted	








incidence	 of	 poverty	 in	 the	 countryside	 dramatically	 reduce,	 which	 contributed	 to	
agricultural	 productivity	 and	 created	 social	 conditions	 that	 were	 conducive	 to	 swift	
industrialization.	Land	reform	gave	former	tenants	and	farm	laborers	economic	security.	This	
enabled	them	to	send	their	children	to	school,	which	in	turn	created	a	skilled	workforce	for	









Of	 the	 two	cases	 studied	where	 land	 reform	was	not	 implemented,	 landlessness	and	 rural	
poverty	 continue	 to	 be	 relevant.	 In	 the	 Philippines,	 landed	 elites	 continue	 to	 own	 a	
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significant	 portion	 of	 cultivatable	 land	 because	 of	 the	 flawed	 Comprehensive	 Agrarian	
Reform	Program	 (CARP)	 legislated	 for	 by	 President	Aquino	 in	 1988.	 It	 has	 enabled	 landed	
elites	 to	 undermine	 the	 purported	 purpose	 of	 the	 scheme	 by	 distributing	 land	 to	 family	
members.	Poor	 information	on	 land	ownership	continues	 to	be	a	problem	and	has	helped	
landed	 elites	 to	 evade	 land	 redistribution	 (Ballesteros	 and	 Cruz	 2006).	 CARP	 also	 favored	
landed	 elites	 by	 setting	 a	 high	 land	 retention	 limit	 of	 14	 hectares,	 prioritizing	 the	
redistribution	of	public	 land	over	private	 land,	and	allowing	 landed	elites	to	determine	the	
beneficiaries	 of	 land	 redistribution,	 as	 well	 as	 those	 excluded	 from	 the	 program	 (Tadem	
2015).	 In	 2014,	 26	 years	 since	 it	 was	 first	 enacted,	 CARP	 expired	 when	 members	 of	 the	







the	 CARP,	 land	 from	 Hacienda	 Luisita,	 the	 Aquino	 family	 estate,	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 fully	















outsider,	 Rodrigo	 Duterte	 was	 elected	 as	 president	 in	 2016;	 he	 “tapped	 into	 a	 deep	
resentment	 at	 the	 immense	 wealth	 and	 political	 sway	 amassed	 by	 a	 few	 elite	 families”	
(Economist	14	May	2016).	Perhaps	 if	 traditional	governing	elites	were	able	to	perceive	the	




result	 incidences	 of	 rural	 poverty	 have	 dramatically	 improved.	 In	 1960,	 the	 agricultural	
sectors’	 share	 of	 GDP	was	 close	 to	 40	 percent,	 but	 fell	 to	 25.4	 percent	 by	 1980	 and	 has	
continued	 to	wane.	 As	 the	 agricultural	 sectors’	 share	 of	GDP	declined,	 banking,	 insurance	
and	real	estate	sectors	share	increased.	Rates	of	rural	poverty	in	Thailand	improved	because	
the	area	of	cultivation	expanded	and	there	was	successful	diversification	 into	a	number	of	
profitable	 cash	 crops.	 Income	 opportunities	 outside	 of	 the	 agricultural	 sector,	 which	
accompanied	 the	 structural	 changes	 to	 the	 economy	 also	 helped	 to	 reduce	 incidences	 of	
rural	 poverty.	While	 Thai	Governments	 have	 improved	 the	 livelihood	of	 their	 people	 over	
time,	the	Thai	agricultural	sector	itself	has	been	neglected.	There	has	been	a	lack	of	policies	
to	 improve	 inequality,	 including	 changes	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 land	 ownership	 (Krongkaew	
1985).		
	
While	 poverty	 has	 been	 reduced,	 inequality	 between	 the	 rural	 and	 urban	 populations	 in	
Thailand	has	increased.	Prior	to	the	military	coup	in	Thailand	in	2014,	Prime	Minister	Thaksin	
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Shinawatra	 attempted	 to	boost	 the	 income	of	 the	 rural	 poor,	 albeit	 via	means	other	 than	
land	 reform.	 The	 ruling	 military	 junta	 has	 since	 focused	 on	 the	 interests	 of	 its	 base,	 the	
urban	middle	 class.	 Even	 prior	 to	 the	military	 coup,	 the	World	 Bank	 estimated	 that	more	
than	70	percent	of	Thailand’s	public	expenditure	in	2010	targeted	the	Greater	Bangkok	area,	
which	 is	 home	 to	 only	 17	 percent	 of	 the	 population	 (Economist	 1	 August	 2016).	While	 a	
number	 of	 reforms	 are	 required	 to	 improve	 the	 plight	 of	 the	 rural	 poor	 in	 Thailand,	 land	
reform	is	one	of	them.	Jon	Fernquest,	in	an	editorial	for	the	Bangkok	Post	in	February	2016,	
notes	 that	 Thailand	 is	 “plagued	 by	 seriously	 inequitable	 land	 distribution”	 and	 that	 “land	
reform	requires	strong	political	will…and	a	thorough	understanding	of	how	land	inequity,	an	
unequal	 power	 structure	 and	 political	 violence	 are	 related.”	 The	 story	 of	 land	 reform	 in	
Thailand	and	the	Philippines	is	yet	to	be	finished.	
	 	
	 98	
	Reference	List	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Acemoglu,	D.,	Robinson,	J.	A.	(2001).	A	Theory	of	Political	Transitions.	American	Economic	
Review	91(4),	938-963.		
	
Adams,	M.	E.	(1995).	Land	Reform:	New	Seeds	on	Old	Ground?	Natural	Resource	
Perspectives	6.	
	
Ballesteros,	M.,	Cruz,	A.	(2006).	Land	Reform	and	Changes	in	Land	Ownership	Concentration:	
Evidence	from	Rice-Growing	Villages	in	the	Philippines.	Philippine	Institute	for	
Development	Studies,	21.	
	
Ban,	S.	H.,	Perkins,	D.	H.	&	Moon,	P.Y.	(1980).	Rural	Development	in	Korea.	Cambridge:	
Harvard	University	Press.			
	
Bernstein,	H.	(2002).	Land	Reform:	Taking	a	Longer	View.	Journal	of	Agrarian	Change,	2(4),	
433–463.		
	
Berry,	R.	A.,	Cline,	W.	R.	(1979).	Agrarian	Structure	and	Productivity	in	Developing	Countries.	
Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press.	
	
Bobrow-Strain,	A.	(2004).	(Dis)Accords:	The	Politics	of	Market-Assisted	Land	Reforms	in	
Chiapas,	Mexico.	World	Development,	32(6),	887–903.		
	
Borras,	S.	M.	(2007).	Pro-poor	Land	Reform:	A	Critique.	Ottawa:	University	of	Ottawa	Press.	
	
Boyce,	J.,	Rosset,	P.,	Stanton,	E.	(2005).	Land	Reform	and	Sustainable	Development.	Political	
Economy	Research	Institute	Working	Paper,	98.		
	
Campos,	J.	E.,	Root,	H.	L.	(1996).	The	Key	to	the	Asian	Miracle:	Making	Shared	Growth	
Credible.	Washington	D.C.:	Brookings	Institution.		
	
Chambers,	R.	G.	(1992).	On	the	Design	of	Agricultural	Policy	Mechanisms.	American	Journal	
of	Agricultural	Economics,	74(3),	646–654.		
	
Conning,	J.	H.,	&	Robinson,	J.	A.	(2001).	Property	Rights	and	the	Political	Organization	of	
Agriculture.	Journal	of	Development	Economics,	82,	pp.416-447.		
	
Doner,	R.	F.,	Ritchie,	B.	K.,	Slater,	D.	(2005).	Systematic	Vulnerability	and	the	Origins	of	
Development	States:	Northeast	and	Southeast	Asia	in	Comparative	Perspective.	
International	Organization,	59(2),	pp.	327-361.		
	
Dore,	R.	P.	(1965).	Land	Reform	and	Japan’s	Economic	Development.	The	Developing	
Economies,	3(4),	487–496.		
	 99	
	
Downs,	A.	(1957).	An	Economic	Theory	of	Democracy.	Boston:	Harper	and	Row.	
	
El	Ghonemy,	M.	R.	(1990).	The	Political	Economy	of	Rural	Poverty:	The	Case	for	Land	Reform.	
London	and	New	York:	Routledge.	
	
Fallows,	J.	M.	(1994).	Looking	at	the	Sun:	The	Rise	of	the	New	East	Asian	Economic	and	
Political	System.	New	York:	Pantheon	Books.	
	
Fernquest,	J.	(2016).	Land	Reform	Needed	to	Fight	Inequality.	Bangkok	Post.	Retrieved	from	
https://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/work/844956/land-reform-needed-to-fight-
inequality	
	
Ghimire,	K.	B.	(Ed.).	(2001).	Land	Reform	and	Peasant	Livelihoods:	The	Social	Dynamics	of	
Rural	Poverty	and	Agrarian	Reforms	in	Developing	Countries.	Colchester: ITDG	
Publishing.		
	
Grossman,	H.	L.	(1994).	Production,	Appropriation,	and	Land	Reform.	The	American	
Economic	Review	84(3),	705-712.		
	
Hayami,	Y.,	Quisumbing,	M.	A.,	Adriano,	L.	S.	(1990).	Towards	an	Alternative	Land	Reform	
Paradigm:	A	Philippine	Perspective.	Manila:	Ateneo	de	Manila	University	Press.		
	
Herring,	R.	J.	(1983).	Land	to	the	Tiller:	The	Political	Economy	of	Agrarian	Reform	in	South	
Asia.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press.	
	
Horowitz,	A.	W.	(1993).	Time	Paths	of	Land	Reform:	A	Theoretical	Model	of	Reform	Dynamic.	
The	American	Economic	Review,	83(4),	1003-1010.		
	
Huang,	C.,	Kuo,	M.	F.,	Stockton,	H.	(2016).	Consequences	of	MMM	on	Party	Systems.	In	
Batto,	N.	F.,	Huang,	C.,	Tan,	A.	C.,	Cox,	G.	W.	(ed.),	Mixed-Member	Electoral	Systems	in	
Constitutional	Context:	Taiwan,	Japan,	and	Beyond	(pp.	25–51).	Ann	Arbor:	University	
of	Michigan	Press.	
	
Huizer,	G.	(2001).	Peasant	Mobilization	for	Land	Reform:	Historical	Case	Studies	and	
Theoretical	Considerations.	In	Ghimire,	K.	B.	(Ed.),	Land	Reform	and	Peasant	
Livelihoods:	The	Social	Dynamics	of	Rural	Poverty	and	Agrarian	Reforms	in	Developing	
Countries	(pp.	164–198).	Colchester: ITDG	Publishing. 
	
Kay,	C.	(2002).	Why	East	Asia	Overtook	Latin	America:	Agrarian	Reform,	Industrialization	and	
Development.	Third	World	Quarterly,	23(6),	1073–1102.	
	
Kennedy,	L.	(1982).	The	First	Agricultural	Revolution:	Property	Rights	in	Their	Place.	
Agricultural	History,	56(2),	379–390.	
	
King,	G.,	Keohane,	R.	O.,	Verba,	S.	(1994).	Designing	Social	Inquiry:	Scientific	Inference	in	
Qualitative	Research.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.	
	
Kilusang	Magbubukid	ng	Pilipinas	Peasant	Movement	of	the	Philippines	(KMP)	Facebook	
Page.	Retrieved	from	https://www.facebook.com/kilusangmagbubukid/.	Accessed	on	
12	June	2018.			
	 100	
	
Krongkaew,	M.	(1985).	Agricultural	Development,	Rural	Poverty,	and	Income	Distribution	in	
Thailand.	The	Developing	Economies,	23(4),	325–346.		
	
Kuhonta,	E.	(2011).	The	Institutional	Imperative:	The	Politics	of	Equitable	Development	in	
Southeast	Asia.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press.		
	
Kuo,	L.	T.	C.	(1976).	Agriculture	in	the	People’s	Republic	of	China:	Structural	Changes	and	
Technical	Transformation.	New	York:	Praeger.		
	
Ladejinsky,	W.	(1964).	Agrarian	Reform	in	Asia.	Foreign	Affairs,	42,	445–60.	
	
Ledesma,	A.	J.	(1980a).	Land	Reform	Programs	In	East	And	Southeast	Asia:	A	Comparative	
Approach.	Philippine	Studies,	28(3),	305–343.	
	
Ledesma,	A.	J.	(1980b).	Land	Reform	in	East	and	Southeast	Asia:	A	Comparative	Approach.	
Philippine	Studies,	28(4),	451–481.	
	
Lie,	J.	(2000).	Han	Unbound:	The	Political	Economy	of	South	Korea.	Stanford:	Stanford	
University	Press.	
	
Lipton,	M.	(2009).	Land	Reform	in	Developing	Countries:	Property	Rights	and	Property	
Wrongs.	London	and	New	York:	Routledge.	
	
Manasca,	R.,	Tan,	A.	(2012).	“Strong	republic”	Sidetracked:	Oligarchic	Dynamics,	
Democratization,	and	Economic	Development	in	the	Philippines.	Korea	Observer,	
43(1),	47–88.	
	
Moore,	B.	(1966).	Social	Origins	of	Dictatorship	and	Democracy:	Lord	and	Peasant	in	the	
Making	of	the	Modern	World.	Boston:	Beacon	Press.	
	
Muscat,	R.	J.	(1994).	The	Fifth	Tiger:	A	Study	of	Thai	Development	Policy.	Tokyo:	United	
Nations	University	Press.	
	
North,	D.	C.	(1981).	Structure	and	Change	in	Economic	History.	New	York:	Norton.	
	
Olson,	M.	(1982).	The	Rise	and	Decline	of	Nations.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press.		
	
Overholt,	W.	H.	(1976).	Land	Reform	in	the	Philippines.	Asian	Survey,	16(5),	427–451.		
	
Prosterman,	R.	L.,	Riedinger,	J.	M.	(1987).	Land	Reform	and	Democratic	Development.	
Baltimore:	John	Hopkins	University	Press.		
	
Putzel,	J.	(1992).	A	Captive	Land:	The	Politics	of	Agrarian	Reform	in	the	Philippines.	London	
and	New	York:	Monthly	Review	Press.	
	
Ramsay,	J.	A.	(1982).	The	Limits	of	Land	Reform	in	Thailand.	The	Journal	of	Developing	Areas,	
16(2),	173–196.	
	
Reyes,	C.	M.	(2002).	Impact	of	Agrarian	Reform	on	Poverty.	Philippine	Journal	of	
Development,	54,	63-131.			
	 101	
	
Riedinger,	J.	M.	(1995).	Agrarian	Reform	in	the	Philippines:	Democratic	Transitions	and	
Redistributive	Reform.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press.	
	
Rodrik,	D.	(1995).	Getting	Interventions	Right:	How	South	Korea	and	Taiwan	Grew	Rich.	
Economic	Policy,	20,	55–107.	
	
Rueschemeyer,	D.,	Stephens,	E.	H.,	Huber,	E.,	Stephens,	J.	D.	(1992).	Capitalist	Development	
and	Democracy.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press.	
	
Rueschemeyer,	D.,	&	Stephens,	J.	D.	(1997).	Comparing	Historical	Sequences-A	powerful	
Tool	for	Causal	Analysis.	A	Reply	to	John	Goldthorpe’s	Current	Issues	in	Comparative	
Macro-Sociology.	Comparative	Social	Research,	16,	55–72.	
	
Shin,	G.	W.	(1998).	Agrarian	Conflict	and	the	Origins	of	Korean	Capitalism.	American	Journal	
of	Sociology,	105(5),	1309-1351.			
	
Starner,	F.	L.	(1961).	Magsaysay	and	the	Philippine	Peasantry.	Berkeley:	University	of	
California	Press.	
	
Tadem,	E.	C.	(2015).	Philippine	Agrarian	Reform	in	the	21st	Century.	The	Regional	Center	for	
Social	Science	and	Sustainable	Development:	Chiang	Mai	University.	
	
Tai,	H.	(1974).	Land	Reform	and	Politics:	A	Comparative	Analysis.	Berkeley	and	Los	Angeles:	
University	of	California	Press.	
	
The	Economist,	(2016).	The	Dangers	of	Farsightedness	-	Thailand’s	Economy.	Retrieved	from	
https://www.economist.com/asia/2016/10/01/the-dangers-of-
farsightedness?zid=306&ah=1b164dbd43b0cb27ba0d4c3b12a5e227	
	
The	Economist,	(2016).	Fist	of	Iron	-	The	Philippines.	Retrieved	from	
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/05/14/fist-of-iron		
	
The	Philippine	Star	(2014a).	After	26	Years,	CARP	Ends.	Retrieved	from	
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/06/30/1340617/after-26-years-carp-ends	
	
The	Philippine	Star	(2014b).	CARP	Expires	This	Month.	Retrieved	from	
https://www.philstar.com/nation/2014/06/17/1335524/carp-expires-month	
	
Tuma,	E.	H.	(1965).	Twenty-Six	Centuries	of	Agrarian	Reform:	A	Comparative	Analysis,	
Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press.	
	
Vargas,	A.	(2003).	The	Philippines	Country	Brief:	Property	Rights	and	Land	Markets.	(4–47).	
Land	Tenure	Centre,	University	of	Wisconsin–Madison.	
	
Waldner,	D.	(1999).	State	Building	and	Late	Development.	Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press.	
	
White,	L.	T.	(2009).	Political	Booms:	Local	Money	and	Power	in	Taiwan,	East	China,	Thailand,	
and	the	Philippines.	Singapore;	Hackensack,	NJ:	World	Scientific.	
	
	 102	
World	Bank,	(1993).	The	East	Asian	Miracle:	Economic	Growth	and	Public	Policy	(No.	12351)	
(1–402).	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.		
	
You,	J.	(2014).	Land	Reform,	Inequality,	and	Corruption:	A	Comparative	Historical	Study	of	
Korea,	Taiwan,	and	the	Philippines.	The	Korean	Journal	of	International	Studies,	12(1),	
191-224.		
	
	
